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ABSTRACT 
The following work explores the processes individuals utilize when making multi-attribute 
choices. With the exception of extremely simple or familiar choices, most decisions we 
face can be classified as multi-attribute choices. In order to evaluate and make choices in 
such an environment, we must be able to estimate and weight the particular attributes of an 
option. Hence, better understanding the mechanisms involved in this process is an 
important step for economists and psychologists. For example, when choosing between two 
meals that differ in taste and nutrition, what are the mechanisms that allow us to estimate 
and then weight attributes when constructing value? Furthermore, how can these 
mechanisms be influenced by variables such as attention or common physiological states, 
like hunger? 
 
In order to investigate these and similar questions, we use a combination of choice and 
attentional data, where the attentional data was collected by recording eye movements as 
individuals made decisions. Chapter 1 designs and tests a neuroeconomic model of multi-
attribute choice that makes predictions about choices, response time, and how these 
variables are correlated with attention. Chapter 2 applies the ideas in this model to 
intertemporal decision-making, and finds that attention causally affects discount rates. 
Chapter 3 explores how hunger, a common physiological state, alters the mechanisms we 
utilize as we make simple decisions about foods. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
What are the algorithms we employ when making simple multi-attribute decisions, such as 
choosing between foods that differ in taste and nutrition? How do we estimate and weight 
attributes as we make decisions? Chapter 1 proposes a new accumulator model, the multi-
attribute attentional drift diffusion model (maDDM), that computationally describes the 
choice process and allows that process to be guided by visual attention. Using a laboratory 
experiment, we find the maDDM makes accurate quantitative predictions about several key 
variables including what we choose, how long it takes to make a choice, and how these 
variables are correlated with attention to different attributes. Furthermore, we estimate an 
attribute-based fixation bias that suggests attention to an attribute increases its subjective 
weight by 5%, while the unattended attribute’s weight is decreased by 10%. Our findings 
imply we may use similar computational processes as we make multi-attribute choices. 
 
Chapter 2 explores the consequences that such a model has for intertemporal choices. It is 
well known that discount rates vary widely, both across and within individuals. We propose 
that a sizable fraction of this variation results from differences in how relative attention is 
allocated to different features of the decision, such as immediate versus future rewards. We 
tested this hypothesis using an experiment in which subjects chose between receiving 
smaller-sooner versus larger-later monetary prizes, while we recorded their attention using 
eye tracking. We find that cross-subject variation in the allocation of attention explained 
between 20% and 35% of the individual differences in discounting, and that cross-trial 
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variation explained about 30% of the subjects’ ability to choose the delayed option. We 
carried out two additional experiments in which we exogenously manipulated the allocation 
of attention, and found that shifting attention to the attributes that are relatively more 
attractive in the larger-later option increased patience. Together, these results are consistent 
with the existence of a causal impact of relative attention on intertemporal choice. 
 
Chapter 3 seeks to understand how certain physiological states can influence the attribute 
estimation and weighting process. Individuals commonly mispredict their future 
preferences when they make decisions in a visceral state different from their anticipated 
state at consumption. We used a bidding food task to test whether cold-to-hot and hot-to-
cold errors are symmetric in size and driven by similar mechanisms, while we exogenously 
varied subjects’ hunger levels at the time of decision and consumption. We found that the 
effect size is symmetric: hungry subjects overbid 20 cents for a snack to eat when they 
would be satiated, and satiated subjects underbid 19 cents for a snack to eat when they 
would be hungry. Furthermore, we found evidence that these gaps are being driven by 
symmetric mechanisms that operate on the evaluation of visceral features of food, like 
taste, as opposed to more cognitive dimensions, like health. 
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C h a p t e r  1  
THE MULTI-ATTRIBUTE ATTENTIONAL DRIFT DIFFUSION MODEL 
Except for very simple and familiar choices, most decisions require the identification and 
weighting of multiple attributes. Examples include choosing between two meals that differ 
in their taste, nutrition, and costs, or choosing between slot machines that differ in the 
likelihood and size of the potential rewards. Given their prevalence, understanding the 
algorithms that we use to make multi-attribute choices, and how they are affected by 
contextual variables, is a central question in psychology, economics, and neuroscience 
(Busemeyer & Johnson, 2004; Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995; Glimcher & Fehr, 
2014; Fehr & Rangel, 2011). 
 
While much evidence suggests we differentially weight attributes in decision-making, the 
additional impact of attending to particular attributes of a choice is currently unclear. For 
instance, suppose a restaurant menu contains a daily special of steak with a side of green 
beans. Furthermore, assume a decision-maker enjoys steak, but dislikes green beans. 
Although many theories suggest an optimal decision maker may properly weight these 
variables (according to some subjective weights) as they decide whether or not to order the 
meal, one open question asks whether we can quantitatively determine how differentially 
attending to the steak and green beans can impact the probability of ordering this meal. If 
most of the decision-maker’s attention shifts to the steak, would they be more likely to 
order the meal and if so, by how much does the probability of ordering increase with 
additional attention? To address these questions we propose a computational model, which 
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we call the multi-attribute attentional drift diffusion model (maDDM). Our model details 
the choice process by modeling how attention to attributes, at the level of random eye 
fixations, alters individual choices.  
 
Our model builds on two main literatures. First, previous work has shown sequential 
integrator models of decision-making, such as the Drift-Diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978; 
Ratcliff et al., 2003; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004), leaky-accumulator model (Usher & 
McClelland, 2001), and Decision Field Theory (DFT) (Busemeyer et al., 1993; Busemeyer 
& Townsend, 1992; Roe et al., 2001; Busemeyer & Diederich, 2002; Diederich, 1997) 
provide accurate quantitative accounts of how choice probabilities and reaction times vary 
with properties of the choice options. These models typically assume choices are made 
using a relative value signal that is dynamically computed by integrating an instantaneous 
noisy measure of the desirability of options, and that a choice is made when the 
accumulated relative value signal becomes sufficiently strong in favor of one of two 
options. Furthermore, a growing body of evidence from neuroscience has found that the 
implementation of certain sequential integrator models is biologically plausible (Britten et 
al., 1992; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren et al., 2008; Rangel and Clithero, 2013; Hare 
et al., 2011). 
 
Second, previous work suggests that this integration process exhibits an attentional bias: 
attended options and attributes are weighted more heavily. Examples include the attentional 
Drift-Diffusion Model (aDDM) (Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Krajbich 
et al., 2012; Fehr & Rangel, 2011) and DFT (Busemeyer et al., 1993; Busemeyer & 
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Townsend, 1992; Roe et al., 2001; Busemeyer & Diederich, 2002; Diederich, 1997). 
While both the aDDM and DFT attempt to explain the underlying choice process, the two 
literatures have progressed slightly differently. For instance, the aDDM has investigated 
how the value computation process changes as a function of random eye fixations to 
different options (Krajbich et al., 2010) while DFT has modeled attention by appealing to a 
dynamic attention function that weights information over time (Roe et al., 2001; Diederich, 
1997), but does not rely on fixation data to quantify how attention is distributed throughout 
a decision. On the other hand, DFT has certain benefits, as it has developed a deep 
understanding of both multi-attribute choice and choices over multiple options while the 
aDDM has only been extended to choice over a small number of options and has not 
modeled multi-attribute choice. Our work attempts to take a step in unifying these two 
literatures by extending the underlying principles of the aDDM to a case of simple multi-
attribute choice. 
 
To test our model, we conduct a laboratory experiment where participants make decisions 
over whether to consume multi-attribute bundles of food while we record their eye 
movements between two attributes. Critically, our results provide a quantitative estimate 
for how attending to particular attributes of a choice can alter the weights those attended 
features receive when computing value: we find subjects overweight the currently attended 
attribute and underweight the unattended attribute. 
 
The theory and experiment here allows us to address two main questions about the 
computational process involved in making multi-attribute choices. First, are similar 
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computations performed when making multi-attribute decisions as when making multi-
alternative decisions? This question evaluates how well principles of the aDDM can be 
extended to the maDDM, an important test in understanding this new choice domain. 
Second, by how much do subjects overweight attended features and underweight 
unattended features, if at all? This second question is important because although there is 
previous evidence that fixations bias choice, there is little work estimating the quantitative 
impact of how attention to attributes alters the likelihood of choosing an option. 
 
Results 
As illustrated in Figure 1, every trial hungry subjects are shown a bundle of two foods, one 
appetitive and one aversive, and have to decide whether or not they want to eat both a 
minimum of three bites of both of the foods (see Methods for details). Subjects make such 
choices for 200 different bundles, and at the end of the experiment the decision that they 
made in a randomly selected trial is implemented. Subjects also completed two rating tasks 
in which they provided liking ratings for each food individually, and for each of the choice 
bundles. 
 
We focus on this simple choice task because it is the simplest possible setting in which 
multi-attribute choice can be studied. Here, the choice objects are the bundles. Each bundle 
consisted of one appetitive food and one aversive food. Hence, the bundles contain two 
attributes: an appetitive and an aversive stimulus. The liking ratings provide a measure of 
the attribute values for each bundle.  
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Importantly, in order to study the role of relative attention to the attributes, we monitored 
fixations during the choice task with eye tracking. Although it is well known that fixations 
and attention can be dissociated (Posner et al., 1977; Egly et al., 1994), for the purposes of 
this experiment fixations appear to provide a reasonable measure of attention at any instant 
during the choice process. 
 
Model. The experiment was designed to allow us to test the ability of the maDDM to 
account for the relationship between fixations, choices, and reaction times in a simple 
multi-attribute choice setting. To see why, we begin by describing the model and its 
properties. 
 
The model assumes that the value of a bundle, denoted by VB, is given by a linear 
combination of the values of the appetitive food (VP) and the aversive foods (VN); i.e.,  
 
VB = β0 + βPVP + βNVN. 
 
Note that the rating tasks provide a measure of each of these values, which allows us to test 
the general validity of this assumption. To do so, for every subject we estimated a linear 
regression of the bundle ratings on the ratings of the appetitive and the aversive foods, and 
found that the data approximates the assumption reasonably well (mean β0 = 0.59, SD = 
2.17; mean βP = 0.61, SD = 0.40; mean βN = 0.99, SD = 0.74; mean R2 = 0.32, SD = 0.18). 
We further tested for an interaction effect by including an additional regressor, VP*VN, in 
the above linear combination. After estimating this regression for every subject, we found 
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the mean coefficient on the interaction was 0.14 (SD = 0.31); however, the mean 
difference in R2 before and after adding this term was only 0.007 (minimum = 0.00, 
maximum = 0.03). Furthermore, running a mixed-effects linear regression with the 
interaction term found the coefficient to be insignificant with an estimate of 0.077 (p > 
0.05). Hence, we find little evidence to suggest an interaction effect occurred and analyze 
the data without this term. 
 
As depicted in Figure 2, the maDDM assumes that decisions are made by integrating a 
relative decision value (RDV) signal over time until enough evidence is accumulated in 
favor of one of the two options: choice = “yes” or choice = “no.” In particular, the subjects 
choose “yes” if the barrier crossed is at B = +1, and choose “no” if the barrier crossed is at 
B = -1. The model also predicts reaction times, since choice time equals the time the barrier 
is crossed.  
 
A key property of the model is that both the bundle properties and attention are allowed to 
influence the evolution of the RDV signal, and thus how choices are made. In particular, 
the model assumes that there is a fixation bias, so that attending to a particular attribute 
increases the weight that attribute is assigned in the integration process. Specifically, when 
looking at the appetitive attribute the RDV evolves according to  
 
RDVt = RDVt-1 + d(β0 + δβPVP + θβNVN) + εt 
 
and when looking at the aversive attribute, it evolves according to 
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RDVt = RDVt-1 + d(β0 + θβPVP + δβNVN) + εt. 
 
Here, RDVt indicates the value of the RDV signal at time t, d is a constant that controls the 
speed of integration (in units ms-1), δ is a parameter that can take values greater than or 
equal to 1 and reflects the fixation bias towards the currently fixated attribute, θ is a 
constant between 0 and 1 that reflects a fixation bias to the currently non-fixated attribute, 
and εt is i.i.d. white Gaussian noise with variance σ2 that reflects the stochastic nature of the 
process.  
 
Importantly, the model assumes that the fixation process between the two attributes is 
independent of each individual attribute’s value, or of the location of the positive and 
negative items. In particular, the first fixation is assumed to go to the left attribute with a 
constant probability p. Fixations then alternate between the two foods until a barrier is 
crossed. At the beginning of each fixation, a maximum fixation length is drawn from a 
distribution that depends on the type of attribute (appetitive or aversive), and whether the 
fixation is a first fixation or a later one. The fixation is then allowed to run its course unless 
a barrier is crossed before it terminates, which ends the choice process.  
 
Several properties of the model are worth highlighting. 
 
First, the model includes as a special case a multi-attribute DDM without attentional bias, 
which arises when δ = θ = 1. This model is almost identical to the standard DDM that has 
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been widely used in the previous literature to study binary choices in a large number of 
domains, including simple choices (Milosavljevic et al., 2011; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & 
Smith, 2004).  
 
Second, the model exhibits a fixation bias when δ > 1 or θ < 1. In that case, an exogenous 
relative increase in attention to the appetitive food biases choices towards consuming the 
bundle, while the opposite is true for an exogenous decrease. Figure 2 provides an intuition 
for why this is the case. Consider a case in which βP = βN = 1, VP = -VN, and β0 = 0. Here, in 
the absence of an attentional bias (i.e., when δ = θ =1), the slope of the RDV is always 
zero, and the choice is determined simply by the realization of noise. In contrast, when θ < 
1 < δ the slope of the RDV signal is positive when looking at the appetitive attribute, and 
negative otherwise. As a result, the probability of choosing “yes” depends on the relative 
allocation of attention. 
 
Third, the model has four free parameters (d, δ, θ, σ) that can be fitted using the choice, 
fixation, and reaction time data. The model has a fifth parameter, given by the height of the 
barrier, which is assumed to be fixed at ±1. This is without loss of generality because 
multiplying the barriers, slope, and noise by a fixed constant has no effect on the model’s 
predictions. 
 
Fourth, and somewhat more technical, the model allows for an asymmetric bias on the 
attended and unattended attributes (as opposed to requiring that δ - 1 = 1 - θ). This 
asymmetry can be identified from the data as long as β0 is non-zero. 
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Model Fitting. We fitted the model using MLE on the pooled group data (see Methods for 
details). Importantly, parameters were fitted using only the even-numbered trials, and the 
odd trials were used to test the predictions of the best fitting model out of sample.  The best 
fitting parameters where d = 0.0013, σ = 0.02, δ = 1.05, and θ = 0.90 (log-likelihood = -
18,016). 
 
In order to test for the presence of a fixation bias, we also fitted a model with the restriction 
δ = θ = 1. The best restricted model also had d = 0.0013 and σ = 0.02 (log-likelihood =  -
18053). A likelihood ratio test statistic provided support in favor of the unrestricted model 
with a small but significant fixation bias model (p < 0.001).  
 
In order to test for the asymmetry of the fixation bias, we also fitted a model with the  
restriction δ – 1 = 1 – θ. The best restricted model had parameters d = 0.0012, σ = 0.0225, δ 
= 1.025, and θ = 0.975 (log-likelihood value = -18053). A likelihood ratio test provided 
support in favor of the asymmetric fixation bias (p < 0.001).  
 
Together, these results are consistent with the existence of small and asymmetric fixation 
bias. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the size of these fixation biases are 
significantly smaller than those that have been found in previous studies of simple choice 
(Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Krajbich et al., 2012). 
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Basic Psychometrics. Figure 3 compares the basic psychometric properties of the data 
with the predictions generated by the best fitting model. In this figure, and the following 
ones, black denotes data and red denotes out of sample predictions. Both data and 
predictions are shown only for odd trials, to insure that the comparison is out-of-sample. 
Predictions were made by simulation the best-fitting model 4,000 times for each bundle 
liking rating, and sampling fixation lengths from the empirical distribution of observed 
fixations, conditioning only on whether a fixation was to an appetitive or aversive attribute, 
and whether the fixation was a first a later one. See Methods for more details.  
 
Figure 3A depicts the psychometric choice curve. It shows that the probability of choosing 
yes is a logistic function of the bundle value which matches well the predictions of the best 
fitting model (goodness of fit test: p = 0.48).  
 
Figure 3B depicts the reaction time curve, which exhibits the typical inverted-U pattern of 
reaction time when plotted against the liking rating of the bundle, so that more difficult 
choices take longer. The data also matches the predictions of the best fitting model 
(goodness of fit test: p = 0.27).  
 
Finally, Figure 3C depicts the fixation curve, which shows that the number of fixations that 
it takes to make a choice increases with the difficulty of the choice. Although both the data 
and predictions exhibit the same general pattern, the model over predicts the impact of 
choice difficult on the number of fixations, as well as the average number of fixations 
(data: coefficient on difficulty = -.24, mean = 2.79; model: coefficient on difficulty = -0.44, 
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mean = 3.15). Part of the mismatch between actual and predicted fixations has to do with 
technical limitations of the fitting and prediction procedure, which are discussed in more 
detail in the final Discussion section. 
 
Properties of the Fixation Process. As described above, the basic maDDM assumes that 
fixations are independent of the value of the foods. Here we test if the pattern of observed 
fixations is consistent with this assumption. 
 
As shown in Table S1, subjects exhibited a left-first bias: they looked at the left attribute 
before the right 64% of the time (p < 0.01). However, the location of first fixation was not 
significantly different for positive and negative foods (Table S1, p > 0.05).  
 
As shown in Figure 4, fixations to aversive foods were about 57 ms longer on average than 
fixations to appetitive items, both for first, middle, and last fixations (p < 0.01 in all cases). 
This is consistent with the assumptions of the model listed above, since fixations to 
different attribute types might follow a different process (e.g., they might have a different 
processing latency). The key assumption of the model, to which we turn attention to next, 
is that fixation duration is not dependent on the value of the fixated or unfixated items 
(controlling for their attribute type). We tested this assumption by examining how the 
duration of different types of fixations, either first or middle fixations, was affected by the 
value of the attended and unattended attribute. We ignore final fixations in this analysis 
since their duration is endogenous to the choice process. 
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The duration of the first fixation was not significantly related to the value of the attended 
item (mixed-effects regression of first fixation length on an indicator for whether the item 
is appetitive, the weighted value of the item and the weighted value of the unattended item: 
beta of indicator = -37.92, t-statistic: -1.84; beta for attended value = -1.90, t-statistic = -
0.29; beta for unattended value = -5.38, t-statistic = 1.26). Furthermore, the duration of the 
first fixation was not related to the value of the bundle (mixed-effects regression of first 
fixation length on an indicator for whether the item is appetitive and the value of the 
bundle: beta of indicator = -64.44, t-statistic = -5.31; beta for value of bundle = -0.35, t-
statistic = -0.11) or the difficulty of the choice (mixed-effects regression of first fixation 
length on an indicator for whether the item is appetitive and the absolute value of the 
bundle: beta of indicator = -64.44, t-statistic = -5.26; beta for absolute value of bundle = -
1.49, t-statistic = -0.32). Clearly, the duration of the first fixation was not dependent on 
value. 
 
For middle fixations, we found no significant relationship with the attended value and a 
significant but quantitatively small effect of the unattended value (analogous mixed-effects 
regression: beta of indicator = -24.85, t-statistic: -0.80; beta for attended value = 6.51, t-
statistic = 0.92; beta for unattended value = 17.13, t-statistic = 2.32). Importantly, the size 
of this effect is relatively small as a change in value of the unattended attribute of 2.5, the 
maximum possible change, will only alter middle fixations by 43 ms, on average. 
Furthermore, the duration of the middle fixation was not related to the value of the bundle 
(analogous mixed-effects regression: beta for indicator = -62.04, t-statistic = -3.82; beta for 
value of bundle = -5.55, t-statistic = -0.91), but was slightly related to the difficulty of the 
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choice (analogous mixed-effects regression: beta for indicator = -61.50, t-statistic = -
3.78; beta for absolute value of bundle = -21.61, t-statistic = -2.25). Again, even though we 
found a significant effect here, the effect was quite small in size as a move from the most 
difficult choice, with bundle value 0, to the simplest, with an absolute bundle value of 3, 
only corresponds to a change in fixation duration of -65 ms. 
 
Together, the results in this section suggest that the properties of the observed fixation 
process are largely consistent with the assumption that fixations are independent of changes 
in the value of specific attributes (e.g., example, changing a mildly appetitive item for a 
highly appetitive one). In addition, as shown in Figure S1, there is considerable variation in 
the duration of fixations across trials. This, together with the tests supporting the existence 
of a small but significant attentional bias, suggests that fluctuations in attention might be 
responsible for some of the observed differences in choices. 
 
Model Predictions. The maDDM makes additional predictions about the pattern of the 
fixations, and their relationship to choices, which we test here. 
 
First, the model predicts that final fixation durations should be shorter than middle fixation, 
since final fixations are terminated prematurely when a barrier is crossed. As shown in 
Figure 4, this also holds in our data (mean last = 376 ms; mean middle = 550 ms; p < 0.01).  
 
Interestingly, we also found that first fixations were shorter than middle fixations (mean 
first= 309 ms; mean middle = 550 ms; p < 0.01). Note that although the model made no ex-
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ante prediction about the relationship between these two types of fixations, this pattern 
was incorporated in our prediction exercise, since fixation durations were conditioned on 
whether a fixation was first or later. 
 
Second, the model predicts a strong relationship between the fixation-averaged value at the 
start of the final fixation and the duration of the final fixation, conditional on the choice 
made. Specifically, the model predicts that conditional on a “no” choice, the duration of the 
final fixation should increase with the variable 
 
FP(β0 + δβPVP + θβNVN) + (1 - FP)(β0 + θβPVP + δβNVN), 
 
where FP denotes the fraction of the trial spent attending to the appetitive item (as of the 
beginning of the last fixation). Essentially, this variable measures the average slope of the 
RDV signal during the initial phase of the choice, given the realization of fixations up to 
that point. The intuition for this relationship illustrates the key forces at work in the 
maDDM, and are best seen using a hypothetical case in which βP=βN=1, VP = -VN, and 
β0=0. In this case, when θ < 1< δ the slope of the RDV is positive when fixating to the 
appetitive attribute, and negative otherwise. As a result, the larger FP, the farther the RDV 
signal is likely to be from the “choose no” barrier at the beginning of the last fixation. Thus, 
the process needs to cover more distance during the last fixation to reach the “no” barrier, 
leading to a longer last fixation. 
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To test this prediction, we estimated a mixed-effects regression of final fixation duration 
on the final fixation average value variable, for trials in which the subjects choose “no.” 
Consistent with the prediction, we found a significant effect between the two (slope = 
33.87, t-statistic = 4.22). The model makes an analogous prediction for trials in which the 
subject chooses yes, albeit with the opposite sign, which was also present on the data (slope 
= -24.17, t-statistic = -2.43). 
 
These results demonstrate that several key predictions regarding the pattern of fixations and 
their relationship to choices hold in the data. 
 
Choice Biases. When θ < 1 < δ, the maDDM predicts a number of attentional driven 
biases, that we test in this section. This provides an additional set of model tests, which we 
also carried out. 
 
First, the model predicts that, controlling for bundle values, the probability of choosing 
“yes” increases with the relative attention to the appetitive attribute interacted with its 
subjective value, and decreases with additional time spent attending to the aversive 
attribute interacted with its subjective value. To test for this effect in our data, we run a 
mixed-effects logistic regression of choice on bundle rating, the weighted value of the 
appetitive food (=βPVP) interacted with its relative fixation time, and the weighted value of 
the aversive food (=βNVN) interacted with its relative fixation time. Consistent with the 
predictions, we found a negligible bias (constant = -0.20, p = .43), a significant increase in 
the probability of choosing “yes” with bundle value (slope = 1.14, p < 0.01) and the value 
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of the appetitive food weighted by its share of relative attention (slope = 0.37, p < 0.05), 
and a significant decrease in the probability of saying yes with the value of the aversive 
item weighted by its relative attention (slope= -0.56, p < 0.01). Similar effects were found 
in the simulated data (constant = .11, p < 0.01; slope bundle rating = 0.62, p < 0.01, slope 
weighted value appetitive item interacted with relative fixation time = 0.07, p < 0.01; slope 
weighted value aversive item interacted with relative fixation time = -0.52, p < 0.01). 
 
It is worth emphasizing that, despite the small effect of the fixation bias coefficients (θ and 
δ), the resulting choice biases need not be small. To see why, consider an example in which 
suppose the bundle liking rating is 0, the appetitive attribute has a rating of 2, the aversive 
attribute has a rating of -2, and the value weights take the mean value over all subjects. Our 
estimate predicts that when an individual spends 10% of the trial attending to the appetitive 
attribute, there is only a 23.9% chance of agreeing to consume the bundle; however, if that 
individual instead spends 90% of the trial attending to the appetitive attribute, the 
probability of responding “yes” increases to 52.4%. In contrast, in a model without a 
fixation bias (θ = δ = 1), this change in the fixation pattern has no effect on the choices.  
 
Second, the model predicts that, controlling for bundle value, the probability of choosing 
“yes” depends on the relative amount of time spent attending to the appetitive item. As 
shown in Figure 5A, this was true in both the data and the model predictions, and the size 
of the two effects was remarkable similar. This test was computed as follows. For every 
trial, we computed a corrected choice measure by subtracting the observed choice (yes = 1, 
no = 0) from the average frequency with which the bundle was chosen for all trials with 
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that bundle rating. We then estimated a linear regression of the corrected choice 
probabilities on the relative time advantage to the appetitive item and found the predicted 
effect in both the simulated data  (slope = 0.04; p < 0.01) and the data (mixed-effects 
regression slope = 0.04, t-stat = 3.56).  
 
Third, the model predicts that the longer the first fixation is to the appetitive item, 
interacted with its weighted value, the more likely the subject is to choose “yes.” To see 
why, note that longer first fixations move the RDV signal towards the “yes” barrier, which 
all else equal biases choices towards “yes.” To test this, we estimated a mixed-effects 
logistic regression of choice on the duration of the first fixation, conditioning on a first 
fixation to the positive attribute, and found the predicted effect in both the data and the 
simulations (simulated model: slope = 0.0009, p < 0.01; data: slope = 0.0017, p < 0.01). 
We also found the analogous effect for first fixations to the aversive item (simulated model: 
slope = -0.0010, p < 0.01; data: slope = -0.0017, p < 0.01). 
 
In a related result, any initial biases in the first attended attribute should translate into 
choice biases. Figure 5B shows that this is the case: a linear regression of the probability 
that a subject looks first at the appetitive food first on the subjects’ average probability of 
choosing shows a significant positive relationship (slope = 0.09; p < 0.04). 
 
Fourth, the model predicts a relationship between the identity of the last fixation and 
choice. In particular, conditional on value of the bundle, it predicts that the probability of 
choosing “yes” is larger when the last fixation is to the chosen item. The intuition for this 
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prediction stems from the fact that the slope of the RDV signal is more likely to be 
positive, and thus climbing towards the “yes” barrier, during fixations to the appetitive 
item.  
 
We estimated a logistic regression of choice on a constant, the bundle liking rating, an 
indicator variable for when the last fixation is to the appetitive item, and the interaction of 
the bundle liking rating with the indicator variable, in the simulations and the actual data. In 
the simulations, we found a significant effect of the identity of the final fixation (beta = 
0.71, p < 0.01), but not of the interaction term (beta = -0.00, p = 0.87). A similar pattern 
was found in the data (last fixation bias to positive indicator: beta = 0.21; p = 0.06; 
interaction term: beta = 0.03; p = 0.60). As shown in Figure 5C, although these biases are 
small, they follow a quantitatively similar pattern in the model predictions and data.   
 
Discussion 
The results described here suggest the maDDM is accurately able to describe the choice 
process in a simple multi-attribute environment. Specifically, the model quantitatively 
describes the relationship between choices, response time, and the correlation of these 
variables with attentional deployment, as measured by fixations. The data suggest that 
individuals increase the weight of an attended attribute by 5% and decrease the weight of 
an unattended attribute by 10%. Consistent with this estimation, a number of attention-
based choice biases found in the data support the model’s predictions. 
 
Although our estimated model parameters suggest a fixation bias alters the decision 
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process, we were surprised by its relatively small effect size. Notably, previous findings 
have estimated that only 30% of an unattended option’s value is accounted for during the 
choice process (Krajbich & Rangel, 2011). There are several possibilities that can explain 
this finding. First, as our model is one of the first applications to model the fixation bias in 
attributes rather than options, it’s possible the fixation bias over attributes is simply smaller 
than over options. Second, our task forces subjects to accept or reject an outcome. If they 
were instead making choices over two or more bundles, a larger bias may be prevalent. 
Understanding how the size of the bias changes with the task is an important step for future 
work. 
 
A natural question about our model concerns the direction of causality between fixations 
and choice. Namely, while our model assumes that fixations bias the value estimation 
process, another possibility is that the value of the attributes directly affects the fixation 
process. Although we have shown some evidence suggesting such an explanation is not 
responsible for driving our results, the best way to address this question is through follow-
up work that provides a causal test of this theory. Several related papers address this issue 
in the contexts of simple food choice and risky decision-making (Armel et al. (2008) and 
Kim et al. (2012)). Furthermore, Lim et al. (2011) find that the vmPFC encodes attention-
modulated relative value signals, suggesting neurobiological evidence that fixations alter 
the choice process. While this literature speculates that there is a causal role from fixations 
to choice, we cannot rule out the possibility that causality also works in the other direction. 
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One limitation of our results is that we applied the maDDM to a scenario with a 
relatively small number of attributes. Many real-world decisions are likely more complex 
than our bundle choices. We chose this simple design for several reasons. First, we wanted 
to understand how the maDDM could be applied to the simplest possible multi-attribute 
choice scenario, an important feature when understanding whether and how these models 
may break down as the task becomes increasingly complex. Second, as the number of 
attributes and options on a screen grows, the model must be able to account for the fixation 
process between features. This is a complex task that may be a rich area for future work, 
but we currently lack a systematic understanding of how to model more than two fixations. 
 
It is worth noting that in our results we find much evidence that has a qualitative flavor of 
loss aversion. Specifically, the duration of a fixation to an aversive attribute is on average 
longer than the duration to an appetitive one, individuals weight aversive attributes more 
heavily than appetitive attributes in choices, and aversive attributes are attended to for a 
longer period of time throughout the choice process. This differential attribute weighting is 
consistent with the literature on loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) while the 
differences in fixations to attributes are consistent with previous process tracking studies of 
loss aversion (Willemsen et al., 2011). This difference in fixation duration to the appetitive 
and aversive attributes can be further explained given that the amount of time one attends 
to a feature appears to influence its weight (Willemsen et al., 2011; Schkade & Johnson, 
1989; Fiske, 1980; Wedell & Senter, 1997). 
 
Our study builds on and contributes to several literatures. First, this paper differentiates 
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itself from previous work in the cognitive modeling of choice in a number of ways. 
While the existing aDDM literature has focused on understanding the role of fixations in 
multi-alternative choice (Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011), it has remained 
silent as to how fixations affect attribute based value estimation. Our model takes a step 
towards understanding this process and extends the aDDM to this choice environment. 
Furthermore, while DFT has previously explored decision-making in multi-attribute choice, 
it has not incorporated eye fixations in understanding how attention to attributes alters an 
attribute’s perceived weights (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1992; Roe et al., 2001; Busemeyer 
& Diederich, 2002; Diederich, 1997). Our contribution is not to suggest that one model 
should be preferred to the other, but that we can accurately describe the choice process by 
utilizing tools from both of these literatures. 
 
Second, our work adds to a large literature that uses process-tracing methods to understand 
the decision process (Russo & Rosen, 1975; Russo & Dosher, 1983; Willemsen et al., 
2011; Johnson et al., 2008; Camerer & Johnson, 2004; Glockner & Herbold, 2011; 
Hortsmann et al., 2009; Towal et al., 2013). While much of this work makes use of eye 
tracking, others test process-based models by tracking mouse movements on a computer 
screen. Furthermore, our work adds to literature that explores how evidence accumulation 
may change throughout the choice process (Ratcliff, 1980; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1982). Our 
work complements these literatures by again demonstrating the usefulness and power of 
this approach in testing and employing choice process models.  
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Finally, our results have a number of implications for public policy and marketing that 
could aid policy designers in altering decisions. Specifically, it helps quantity the effect for 
how ‘nudging’ attention towards a particular attribute can impact behavior by quantifying 
the size of how that variable may be overweighted at the expense of others. For instance, by 
how much can changing a product’s design to highlight particular attributes increase sales? 
This is consistent with work that has found pushing attention towards the health attributes 
of a food, and away from its taste attributes, increases an individual’s ability to make 
healthy dietary choices (Hare et al., 2009). Investigating the size of this effect in other 
choice domains is a critical open question. 
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SI Methods 
Subjects. Forty-six subjects recruited from the Caltech community participated in the 
experiment (63% male; mean age = 26.2). All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision with the use of either contact lenses or glasses. Participants were paid a $5 show-up 
fee and received an additional $25 upon successful completion of the experiment. The 
study was approved by Caltech’s IRB.  
 
Task. Subjects were asked to fast for four hours prior to the start of the experiment. 
Compliance was verified through self-report upon subject arrival, and was required for 
participation. 
 
The experiment consisted of three tasks. Subjects were informed of this at the outset, but 
the tasks were only described to them just before they took place.  
 
In Rating Task 1, subjects performed a liking-rating task over individual snack food items 
shown in a computer screen, one at a time. The image size was 300 x 300, with a screen 
resolution of 1280 x 1024. Subjects were asked to enter a liking rating for each food using 
an integer scale (-3 to 3, framing: “How much would you enjoy that particular food at the 
end of today’s experiment?”). The ratings were entered using the bottom row of the 
keyboard. Subjects could take as long as desired to enter each rating. Thirty unique foods 
were rated and each of them was shown twice to each subject in random order.  
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The foods were selected based on previous studies (Plassmann et al., 2007, Plassmann et 
al., 2010) and contained eighteen foods that were consistently rated as appetitive by 
previous subjects, and eighteen foods that were consistently rated as aversive. See Table S2 
for details.  
 
For every subject, we averaged the two ratings provided for each food in order to create 
subject-specific food classes. Snacks with a positive average rating were labeled as 
“appetitive,” snacks with a negative average rating were classified as “aversive,” and foods 
with a zero average rating were omitted from the remaining tasks. On average, subjects had 
17 appetitive foods and 11 aversive foods. 
 
In Rating Task 2, subjects saw bundles of two foods on the screen and had to provide liking 
ratings over the bundles, using the same integer scale (-3 to 3). In particular, subjects were 
asked to rate “How much would you enjoy taking at least three bites from both of the foods 
shown on the screen?” Every bundle contained one appetitive food and one aversive food 
from the previous round, and subjects could take as long as needed to enter their ratings. As 
shown in Figure 1, one of the items was shown in the left and the other on the right, with 
their location randomized every trial. The number of trials in this task varied across 
subjects, subjects were asked to rate every potential bundle made of one appetitive and one 
aversive food.  
 
Finally, subjects participated in a Choice Task. Every trial they were shown one of the 
bundles from Task 2, and they had to decide (yes/no) if they wanted to take at least three 
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bites from each of the foods at the end of the experiment. Choices were indicated using a 
keyboard button press using the subject’s dominant hand with the index and middle fingers. 
Subjects could take as long as desired to make each choice. The choice task consisted of 
200 trials, selected at random from the set of all possible bundles described above. Subjects 
were instructed that at the end of the experiment they would need to remain in the lab for 
an additional twenty minutes. During this time, one of the two hundred trials was randomly 
selected and their choice in that trial was implemented. This procedure encouraged subjects 
to give incentive compatible responses.  
 
Importantly, we recorded eye movements throughout the task at 500 Hz using a desktop 
mounted SR research Eyelink 1000 eye tracker. The eye tracker was calibrated 
immediately after reading the instructions for this choice task.  
 
Model fitting. As described in Results, the maDDM has four free parameters: the constant 
determining the speed of integration d, the positive fixation bias δ, the negative fixation 
bias θ, and the noise parameter σ. We fitted these parameters at the group level by pooling 
the data from all subjects into a single data set. The parameters were fitted to maximize the 
maximum likelihood of the observed choices and reaction times. Importantly, the model 
was fitted using only even trials, and the odd trials were reserved for out-of-sample 
comparisons, as described in the results section. We fitted the model at the group level to 
both choice and reaction time data for all 46 subjects by pooling all even numbered trials 
into a single data set. The model requires a large amount of data to estimate the parameters 
accurately, and fitting them at the individual level would result in highly noisy estimates. 
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The MLE procedure was conducted as follows. 
 
First, we simulated the model 4000 times for each combination of the model parameters in 
the grid described below, and for each of the seven possible bundle ratings (ranging from -
3 to 3).  The simulations were carried out using 1 ms time steps. 
 
In each simulation, individual liking ratings for both the appetitive and aversive foods were 
drawn from the empirical distribution of liking ratings conditional on the rating of the 
bundle. Furthermore, once a pair of liking ratings was drawn, we chose subject-estimated 
regression weights (β0, βP, and βN) associated with the randomly selected simulated liking 
ratings. For instance, if the drawn liking rating for the appetitive item and the aversive item 
was drawn and belonged to subject i, then subject i’s regression weights were used 
throughout the simulated trial. 
 
In each simulation, we randomly sampled fixations lengths from the empirical distribution 
for the group, conditional on whether it is a first or middle fixation in the trial, and whether 
the fixation was to either the positive or negative food. We also assumed that subjects 
looked first to the left item 68% of the time, which is the frequency observed in the data. 
As in the observed data, we assume fixations alternate between the foods. Although our 
model assumes that fixations between the two items on the screen occur instantaneously, in 
practice there are observed saccade length transitions in each trial. To take this into 
account, in every simulated trial we randomly sampled from the empirical distribution of 
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transition times, and add that sampled transition time to the simulated total fixation time. 
To clarify, in every trial we have a response time (the length of time from stimulus onset to 
response) and total time spent fixating to both items. We say the transition time is the 
difference between these two variables, and the sum of the transition time and total 
simulated fixation time represents the simulated reaction time in a trial.  
 
Second, we used the simulations to compute the likelihood of each observation, for each 
vector of parameters, as follows. Reaction time was discretized into bins of 100 ms, from 0 
to 7500 ms, with an additional bin representing a trial that took longer than 7500 ms. 
Choice data is automatically discretized into yes/no bins. We then used the simulation 
results, conditional on the bundle rating, to compute the frequency with which responses 
followed into each time-choice bin.  
 
Third, we used the data from the previous step to compute the log-likelihood of the data for 
each vector of parameters, and carried out a grid search to identify the vector of parameters 
with the largest maximum likelihood.  
 
To reduce computational costs, this maximization was done in two steps. In step one we 
first did a coarse search over the following parameter space: 
 
d in {0.0001, 0.0005, 0.001, 0.0015, 0.002, 0.0025}  
σ in {0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.025} 
δ in {1, 1.05, 1.1, 1.15} 
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θ in {0.85, 0.9, .95, 1} 
 
which identified (d = 0.0015, σ = 0.02, δ = 1.05, θ = 0.95) as the parameters that 
maximized the log-likelihood. In step two we did a finer search around this vector using the 
grid: 
 
d in {0.001, 0.0011, 0.0012, 0.0013, 0.0014, 0.0015, 0.0016, 0.0017}  
σ in {0.015, 0.0175, 0.02, 0.0225} 
δ in {1, 1.025, 1.05, 1.075, 1.1, 1.125 1.15} 
θ in {0.85, 0.875, 0.9, 0.925, 0.95, 0.975, 1}. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
29 
References 
Armel, C., Beaumel, A., & Rangel, A. (2008). Biasing Simple Choices by Manipulating  
Relative Visual Attention. Judgment and Decision Making, 3, 5, 396- 403. 
 
Britten, K.H, Shadlen, M.N., Newsome, W.T., & Movshon, J.A. (1992). The Analysis of  
Visual Motion: A Comparison of Neuronal and Psychophysical Performance. Journal of  
Neuroscience, 12, 4745-4765. 
 
Busemeyer, J.R. & Diederich, A. (2002). Survey of Decision Field Theory. Mathematical  
Social Science, 43, 345-370. 
 
Busemeyer, J.R. & Johnson, J.G. in Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making (eds  
Koehler, D. & Narvey, N.) 133-154 Blackwell Publishing Co., New York, 2004. 
 
Busemeyer, J.R., & Townsend, J. (1993). Decision Field Theory: A DynamicCognitive  
Approach to Decision Making in an Uncertain Environment. Psychological  
Review, 100, 432-459. 
 
Camerer, C., and Johnson, E. J. (2004). “Thinking about attention in games: backward  
and forward induction,” in The Psychology of Economic Decisions, eds J. Carillo  
and I. Brocas (New York: Oxford University Press), 111–129. 
 
Egly, R., Driver, J., & Rafal, R.D. (1994). Shifting Visual Attention Between Objects and  
Locations: Evidence from Normal and Parietal Lesion Subjects. Journal of  
Experimental Psychology: General, 123, 161-177. 
 
Fehr, E. & Rangel, A. (2011). Neuroeconomic Foundations of Economic Choice: Recent  
Advances. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(4). 
 
Fiske, S.T. (1980). Attention and Weight in Person Perception: The Impact of Negative  
and Extreme Behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 6, 889- 
906. 
 
Glimcher, P. & Fehr, E. Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain. Elsevier,  
London, 2014. 
 
Glockner, A., and Herbold, A.-K. (2011). An eye-tracking study on information  
processing in risky decisions: evidence for compensatory strategies based on  
automatic processes. J. Behav. Decis. Mak. 24, 71–98. 
 
Gold, J.I. & Shadlen, M.N. (2007). The Neural Basis of Decision Making. Annual Review  
of Neuroscience, 30, 535-574. 
 
Hare, T., Camerer, C., & Rangel, A. Self-control in decision-making involves modulation  
of the vmPFC valuation system. Science, 2009, 324:646-648 
  
30 
Hare, T.A., Schultz, W., Camerer, C., O’Doherty, J., Rangel, A. (2011). Transformation of Stimulus Value Signals into Motor Commands During Simple Choice. PNAS:  
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,  
108, 18120-18125. 
 
Heekeren, H.R., Marrett, S., & Ungerleider, L.G. (2008). A General Mechanism for  
Perceptual Decision-Making in the Human Brain. Nature, 431, 859-862. 
 
Horstmann, N., Ahlgrimm, A., and Glockner, A. (2009). How distinct are intuition and  
deliberation? An eye-tracking analysis of instruction induced decision modes.  
Judgm. Decis. Mak. 4, 335–354. 
 
Johnson, E.J., Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M., & Willemsen, M.C. (2008). Process Models  
Deserve Process Data: Comment on Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig  
(2006). Psychological Review, 115, 1, 263-273. 
 
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, Values and Frames. American  
Psychologist, 39, 341-350. 
 
Kim, B.E., Seligman, D., & Kable, J.W. (2012). Preference Reversals in Decision  
Making Under Risk are Accompanied by Changes in Attention to Different  
Attributes. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 6, 109. 
 
Krajbich, I., Armel, C., & Rangel, A. (2010). Visual Fixations and Comparison of Value  
in Simple Choice. Nature Neuroscience, 13, 1292-1298.  
 
Krajbich, I., Lu, D., Camerer, C., & Rangel, A. (2012). The Attentional Drift Diffusion  
Model Extends to Simple Purchasing Decisions. Frontiers in Cognitive Science,  
3, 193. 
 
Krajbich, I., & Rangel, A. (2011). A Multi-Alternative Drift Diffusion Model Predicts the  
Relationship Between Visual Fixations and Choice in Value-Based Decisions.  
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, 13853-13857. 
 
Lim, S.L., O’Doherty, J., & Rangel, A. (2011). The Decision Value Computations in the  
vmPFC and Striatum Use a Relative Value Code that is Guided by Visual  
Attention. Journal of Neuroscience, 31, 13214-13223. 
 
Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M., & Green, J. Microeconomic Theory Cambridge University  
Press, Cambridge, 1995. 
 
Plassmann, H., O'Doherty, J., & Rangel, A. Appetitive and aversive goal values are  
encoded in the medial orbitofrontal cortex at the time of decision making. Journal  
of Neuroscience, 2010, 30:10799-10808.  
 
Plassmann, H., O'Doherty, J., & Rangel, A. Medial OFC encodes willingness-to-pay in  
  
31 
simple economic transactions. Journal of Neuroscience, 2007, 27(37):9984-88. 
 
Posner, M.I., Nissen, M.J., & Ogden, W.C. (1977). Attended and Unattended Processing  
Modes: The Role of Set for Spatial Location. Modes of Perceiving and Processing  
Information Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 137-157. 
 
Rangel, A. & Clithero, J.A. (2013). The Computation of Stimulus Values in Simple  
Choice. Neuroeconomics: Decision-Making and the Brain, 2nd ed. (edited by Paul  
Glimcher and Ernst Fehr), 125-147.  
 
Ratcliff, R. (1978). A Theory of Memory Retrieval. Psychological Review, 85, 59- 
108. 
 
Ratcliff, R. (1980). A Note on Modeling Accumulation of Information When the Rate of  
Accumulation Changes over Time. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 21, 2,  
178-184.  
 
Ratcliff, R., Cherian, A., & Segraves, M. (2003). A Comparison of Macaque Behavior  
and Superior Colliculus Neuronal Activity to Predictions From Models of Two- 
Choice Decisions. Jounral of Neurophysiology, 90, 1392-1407. 
 
Ratcliff, R., & McKoon, G. (1982) Speed and Accuracy in the Processing of False  
Statements About Semantic Information. Journal of Experimental Psychology:  
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 8, 1, 16-36. 
 
Ratcliff, R. & Smith, P. (2004). A Comparison of Sequential Sampling Models For Two- 
Choice Reaction Time. Psychological Review, 111, 333-367. 
 
Roe, R.M., Busemeyer, J.R., & Townsend, J.T. (2001). Multialternative Decision Field  
Theory: A Dynamic Connectionist Model of Decision Making. Psychological  
Review, 108, 2, 370-392. 
 
Russo, J.E. & Dosher, B.A. (1983). Strategies for Multiattribute Binary Choice. Journal  
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9, 4, 676-696. 
 
Russo, J.E. & Rosen, L.D. (1975). An Eye Fixation Analysis of Multialternative Choice.  
Memory & Cognition, 3, 267-276. 
 
Schkade, D. & Johnson, E.J. (1989). Cognitive Processes in Preference Reversals.  
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 44, 203-231.  
 
Towal, R., Mormann, M., & Koch, C. (2013). Simultaneous Modeling of Visual Saliency  
and Value Computation Improves Predictions of Economic Choice. Proceedings  
of the National Academy of Sciences, 110, 3858-3867. 
 
  
32 
 
Usher, M. & McClelland, J.L. (2001). On the time course of perceptual choice: The 
leaky competing accumulator model. Psychological Review, 108, 550-592. 
 
Wedell, D.H. & Senter, S.M. (1997). Looking and Weighting in Judgment and Choice.  
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 70, 41-64. 
 
Willemsen M.C., Böckenholt, U., & Johnson, E.J. (2011). Choice by Value Encoding and  
Value Construction: Processes of Loss Aversion. Journal of Experimental  
Psychology: General,  140, 3, 303-324. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
33 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Experimental design. Subjects participated in a task where they made decisions over 
whether they were willing to take at least three bites from each of the two foods on the 
screen at the end of the experiment. One food was previously rated as appetitive while the 
other was previously rated as aversive. Participants’ eye movements were recorded as they 
made these choices. The timing of each screen is depicted at the bottom of the figure. Each 
subject saw a fixation cross for 500ms, then had as long as they liked to enter a rating or 
make a choice. They then saw feedback for 2000 ms and moved to the next trial 
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Figure 2 
 
Depiction of the maDDM. A relative decision value (RDV) signal evolves over time. Its 
slope is biased towards the fixated item, but random noise is added to the RDV at every 
millisecond. When the RDV hits a barrier, a decision is made. The shaded vertical regions 
represent what item is currently fixated. In this example, three fixations are made (positive, 
negative, positive) and the individual chosen “yes.” The equations below the image 
describe how the RDV is integrated over time. The blue δ parameter describes an increase 
in weight that the attended item receives, while the red θ parameter describes a decrease in 
weight that the unattended item receives. 
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Figure 3 
 
Basic psychometrics. (a) Psychometric choice curve as a function of the bundle liking 
rating. (b) Reaction times as a function of the bundle liking rating. (c) The number of 
fixations in a trial as a function of the bundle liking rating. The red lines indicate the 
model’s predictions. The thickness of the red line in (a) represents the model’s standard 
error, while bars in (b) and (c) represent the standard error. Subject data is shown for the 
odd-numbered trials, with standard errors clustered by subject. 
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Figure 4 
 
Fixation Durations. The mean fixation duration for first, middle, and last fixations split 
dependent on whether the fixation was to the appetitive or aversive item. Standard errors 
are clustered by subject. 
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Figure 5 
 
Choice Biases. (a) Corrected probability of agreeing to eat the bundle as a function of the 
relative time advantage looking at the appetitive item. Bins depict the odd-numbered trials, 
and the red dotted line is the model simulation. To compute the bins, the data was split into 
seven equal bins and the median of each is reported on the horizontal axis. (b) Probability 
of looking at the appetitive item as a function of agreeing to consume the bundle. Each 
circle represents a different subject. (c) The probability of agreeing to consume the bundle 
as a function of the bundle value and whether the last fixation was to the appetitive or 
aversive attribute. Red solid line indicates the model’s prediction when the last fixation was 
to the appetitive item and the red dotted line indicates the model’s prediction when the last 
fixation was to the aversive item. Black dots with a solid connecting line indicates the odd-
numbered data when last fixation was to the appetitive item and black dots with a dotted 
connecting line indicates the data when the last fixation was to the aversive item. Standard 
errors clustered by subject. 
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Table S1 
 
Percent of First Fixations to Each Item 
A. Spatial 
 
Left Right 
Percentage 64.4 35.6 
(22.1) (22.1) 
B. Attribute of Interest 
 
Appetitive Aversive 
Percentage 48.2 51.8 
(6.6) (6.6) 
      
Depicts the mean percent of first fixations to each item by spatial features (Panel A) and 
attribute features (Panel B). Standard deviation given below in parentheses.  
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Table S2 
 
Food Rating Food Rating 
3 Musketeers Candy Bar 1.51 Nature Valley Granola Bar 1.26 
(1.52) (1.35) 
Flamin’ Hot Cheetos 0.72 Milano Cookies 2.00 
(2.12) (1.40) 
Almond Joy Candy Bar 0.40 Peanut M&M’s 1.88 
(2.27) (1.03) 
MilkyWay Candy Bar 1.76 Canned Garbanzo Beans -1.07 
(1.22) (1.78) 
KitKat Candy Bar 2.21 Pureed Green Beans -1.92 
(1.11) (1.35) 
Crunch Bar 1.94 Canned White Meat Chicken -0.80 
(1.19) (1.93) 
Reese’s Peanut Butter 
Cups 
1.73 Soy Sauce -1.71 
(1.70) (1.48) 
Oreos 1.76 Canned Albacore Tuna 0.10 
(1.25) (2.16) 
Tootsie Rolls 0.28 Canned Artichoke Hearts -1.39 
(1.73) (1.86) 
Doritos Cool Ranch Chips 1.61 Pureed Carrots -1.85 
(1.43) (1.33) 
Chocolate Pudding 0.65 Canned Vienna Sausage -1.30 
(2.19) (1.92) 
Twix Candy Bar 1.99 Canned Sweet Peas -0.94 
(1.26) (1.84) 
Snickers Candy Bar 1.69 Canned Deviled Ham Spread 
-1.51 
(1.35) (1.67) 
Butterfinger Candy 0.97 Canned Sardines -1.33 
(1.70) (1.90) 
Ghirardelli Milk Chocolate 2.24 Canned Spinach -1.62 
 (1.02)  (1.62) 
 
Food stimuli used in the experiment. Each stimulus contains the mean rating across 
subjects, with standard deviation below in parentheses. 
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Figure S1 
 
Distribution of fixation durations for (a) first fixations and (b) middle fixations. Solid line 
refers to when the last fixation was to the appetitive item, and the dotted line refers to when 
the last fixation was to the aversive item. 
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C h a p t e r  2  
 
INTERTEMPORAL CHOICES ARE CAUSALLY INFLUENCED BY RELATIVE 
ATTENTION 
 
 
Many important choices involve tradeoffs between immediate and delayed rewards, and 
sound decision-making often requires delaying gratification. Examples include dietary 
choice (e.g., fruit or chocolate cake?), health behaviors (e.g., go to the gym or watch TV at 
home?), and saving (e.g., buy a new car or save for retirement?). Previous work has shown 
that we systematically struggle to delay gratification, that our ability to do so varies across 
decision contexts, and that there are sizable individual differences (1). Unfortunately, the 
mechanisms underlying the contextual and individual differences in discounting are not 
well understood. 
 
Here we propose that variation in how attention is deployed during the choice process can 
account for a sizable portion of the behavioral differences across both contexts and 
individuals. In particular, we hypothesized that contextual variables that shift relative 
attention towards attributes favoring the patient option can induce a causal and sizable 
decrease on discount rates, and thus an increase in the ability to postpone gratification. 
Additionally, we hypothesized that individual differences in attentional patterns can explain 
a sizable portion of the individual differences in discount rates.  
 
This hypothesis builds on several literatures. First, previous work has shown sequential 
integrator models of decision-making, such as the Drift-Diffusion Model (2-4), the leaky-
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accumulator model (5), and Decision Field Theory (DFT) (6-8), provide accurate 
quantitative accounts of how choice probabilities and reaction times vary with the 
properties of the choice options, including intertemporal monetary choice tasks (9-10). 
These models all assume choices are made using a relative value signal that is dynamically 
computed by integrating instantaneous noisy measures of the desirability of the attributes 
associated with the two options, and that a choice is made when the accumulated relative 
value signal becomes sufficiently strong in favor of one of the two options.  
 
Second, previous studies suggest that this integration process exhibits an attentional bias: 
options and attributes are weighted more heavily while they are attended. Examples include 
the attentional Drift-Diffusion Model (aDDM) (11-13) and DFT (6-8). These models 
assume the allocation of attention to the attributes and options are independent of the state 
of the relative value signal or of the values of the attributes. Thus, any variable that shifts 
attention towards attributes that favor choosing the delayed option (e.g., a contextual 
manipulation that affects the saliency of the delayed reward, or a systematic individual 
trait) can increase the likelihood of making a patient decision. Evidence consistent this 
assumption comes from work showing that fixations are affected by relative visual 
saliency, independent of value (14-15), and that choices can be manipulated by 
exogenously changing attention (16-17).  
 
The hypothesis that intertemporal choices are affected by relative attention is important for 
several reasons. First, most of the existing literature attributes individual differences to 
variation in fixed discount rates, which are preference parameters that appear hard to 
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change. In contrast, we propose a significant fraction of the within and between subject 
variation is due to differences in attention. Second, an important goal of this literature is the 
design of policy interventions that increase people’s ability to delay gratification. Knowing 
whether changes in attention can have a sizable impact on the likelihood of making a 
patient choice is useful because ‘nudging’ or ‘re-training’ attention might be easier than 
changing more hard-wired preference parameters. Third, although there is a large literature 
demonstrating that context variables matter (18-21), we currently lack a systematic 
understanding for how these variables affect choices. Our proposal suggests a critical 
element of the problem is to understand how these contextual variables affect attention 
during the choice process. 
 
We report the results of three laboratory experiments designed to test our hypothesis. The 
first experiment combines eye tracking with a common intertemporal choice task in which 
subjects choose between smaller-sooner and larger-later monetary rewards. The experiment 
tests the hypothesis that variation in relative attention, to different options and attributes, 
can explain a sizable fraction of the within and between subject variation in discount rates. 
The second and third experiments manipulate attention exogenously in order to test the 
causal impact of attention on intertemporal choice. 
 
Experiment 1: Correlational Test 
Experiment 1 (Figure 1 and SI Methods) combines a standard intertemporal monetary 
choice paradigm with eye tracking to address the following three questions. First, is the 
correlation between attention (as measured by fixations) and choices consistent with the 
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hypothesis that relative attention affects intertemporal choice? Second, are cross-trial 
fluctuations in relative attention associated with sizable changes in the likelihood of making 
a patient choice? Third, what fraction of the individual differences in discount rates can be 
explained by attentional differences? 
 
Choices. Subjects chose the patient option 54.4% of the time (SD = 27.0%). The average 
value of the estimated hyperbolic discount parameter, 𝑘, was 0.009 (SD = 0.013), which is 
comparable with previous results using this task (1, 22-23). Both indices provide a measure 
of the extent to which subjects discount future rewards. As shown in Figure S1, the two 
measures are significantly correlated (𝛽 = -0.20, p < 0.001). For robustness, below we 
report results using both choice measures. Furthermore, there was significant variation in 
discount rates between subjects (percent patient: max = 91.6, min = 1.4, k: max = 0.055, 
min = 0.0002), which we exploit in several of the analyses below. 
 
Reaction times. Subjects took an average of 2.3 seconds to make a decision (SD = 0.9 
seconds). Reaction times were not significantly different in trials in which a patient or an 
impatient choice was made (p = 0.48, paired t-test). We estimated a linear mixed-effects 
regression of reaction time on trial difficulty, which in this and all future similar analyses 
included random effects for all of the independent variables (including the constant), unless 
otherwise specified. Consistent with the predictions of sequential integration models of 
choice, we found that reaction times increased with difficulty (𝛽 = -0.057, p < 0.01). 
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Average fixation patterns. We used fixations to each of the four regions-of-interest 
(ROIs) as a measure of attention to the individual attributes. Although it is well known that 
it is possible to attend to information without fixating on it, as demonstrated in the literature 
on covert attention (24-25), it appears unlikely that there is a large dissociation between the 
two in this task. 
 
Subjects made an average of 7.0 fixations per-trial (SD = 3.8), which implies that, on 
average, they fixated to the ROIs displaying the different attributes more than once. The 
number of fixations was not significantly different in trials in which a patient or an 
impatient choice was made (p = 0.738, paired t-test). We estimated a mixed-effects linear 
regression of the number of fixations on trial difficulty and found a significant relationship 
(𝛽 = - 0.177, p < 0.01). 
 
Table S1 summarizes the relative fixation time patterns across the four ROIs. Subjects 
spent more time looking at the upper fields in which the amounts were depicted than at the 
lower fields, which contained the delays (paired t-test, p < 0.001). Furthermore, there was 
not a significant difference between attending to the left and right locations (paired t-test, p 
= 0.126); however, subjects spent more time attending to the delayed option than the 
immediate option (paired t-test, p < 0.001).  Finally, there was significant trial-to-trial 
variation for all ROIs, a fact that we exploit in the within subject analyses below. 
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Table S2 summarizes the pattern of first fixation locations across the four ROIs. The 
majority of first fixations were to the top-left location (p < 0.01, t-test of upper left ROI 
versus sum of all other 3 ROIs). It was rare for subjects to first fixate to one of the delays, 
as those always appeared in the bottom ROIs (p < 0.01, t-test of first looking at amounts 
versus first looking at delays). The vast majority of first fixations were to the amounts (p < 
0.001, paired t-test). Given that amounts were always shown in the top location, we do not 
know if this is the result of a spatial bias or a top-down property of the attentional process 
in this class of tasks. There was a small bias towards first looking at the delayed option (p < 
0.001, paired t-test), which suggests that subjects could identify the location of the delayed 
option through peripheral vision and use this information to influence the location of their 
first fixation before the information in the four ROIs had been sampled. 
 
Within subject analysis. As shown in Table S1, relative fixations varied significantly from 
trial to trial. Here we investigate if this variation is associated with changes in the 
likelihood of making a patient choice, and if these changes are consistent with the 
predictions described above. Additionally, we quantify the size of these effects. 
 
To do this, for each ROI we estimated a random-effects logistic regression of patient 
choices on the fraction of time spent fixating on a particular ROI. This was done in a 
separate regression for each ROI because the relative attention measures are not 
independent across ROIs. Thus, each regression should be interpreted as estimating the 
effect of shifting relative attention to the target ROI, while reducing relative attention on 
the other ROIs proportional to their average frequencies. Furthermore, for each ROI we 
  
47 
computed the mean predicted impact of changing relative attention in that ROI from the 
10th to the 90th percentile of the observed distribution of relative attention. To calculate this, 
we sampled random trial numbers 1,000 times for each subject, with replacement. We then 
extracted the fraction of time that was spent attending to the ROI in that trial, and used the 
individually estimated regression weights to calculate the probability that the subject chose 
the patient option in that trial. Next, we calculated the 10th and 90th percentile of the 
distribution of the probability of a patient choice, and report the mean change over subjects, 
which we denote as the mean effect size.  
 
Table 1 summarizes these results. Consistent with the predictions, shifting attention to the 
immediate delay decreased the likelihood of choosing the delayed option, and shifting 
attention to the delayed amount had the opposite effect. Importantly, the predicted effect 
sizes were substantial. For example, a shift from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the 
observed distribution of relative attention to the immediate delay decreases the probability 
of making a patient choice by 35%, as given by the mean effect size.  
 
The table also illustrates that shifting attention to the immediate amount decreases the 
likelihood of making a patient choice, and that shifting attention to the delayed date 
increases that likelihood. These results suggest that an option-based attentional bias, where 
attention to any attribute of an option gives the decision maker evidence in favor of 
choosing that option, might be dominant in this task. This stands in contrast to an attribute-
based attentional bias, where attention to a class of attributes gives the decision maker 
evidence in favor of choosing a particular option. 
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These results suggest that cross-trial variation in attention can explain close to 30% of 
subjects’ ability to choose the delayed outcome. The largest effects were found in the 
attentional differences to the immediate delay and the delayed amount, respectively. 
 
Between subjects analysis. Next we tested if between-subject differences in relative 
attention could explain a substantial fraction of the individual variation in discount rates. 
To do this, we first computed the average relative attention that each subject paid to each of 
the four ROIs. For each ROI, we estimated a linear regression of our subject-level measure 
of patience (either fraction of patient choices or log(k)) on the subject-level measure of 
relative attention paid to the ROI.  
 
Table 2 reports the results. We found a positive correlation between the propensity to shift 
attention to the delayed amount and the likelihood of making a patient choice, and a 
negative correlation between the propensity to shift attention to the immediate delay and 
the likelihood of making a patient choice. In contrast, shifting attention to the immediate 
amount or later delay was not correlated with individual differences in discounting. Since 
the subject-level measures of attending to the different ROIs are correlated (min = -0.84, 
max = 0.17), we also estimated a linear model in which the four attentional measures were 
included. As shown in the right-hand column of Table 2, only the propensity to shift 
attention to the immediate delay was significantly correlated with individual differences in 
discount rates. 
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Two aspects of these results are worth highlighting. First, the results suggest that 
between 20% and 35% of the individual differences in discount rates can be explained 
using differences in the average relative propensity to look at different ROIs. Second, the 
results across subjects are consistent with those found in the previous section; in both cases 
the attentional variable that has the largest impact in explaining variation in patience is the 
propensity to shift attention to the immediate delay, followed by the propensity to look at 
the delayed amount. 
 
Changes in fixations across trials. An important assumption of the models motivating the 
hypothesis tested here is that the allocation of attention is largely exogenous to the state of 
the choice process, and to the value of the attributes. More concretely, these models assume 
that fixations can be modulated by visual features of the stimuli (e.g., text versus numbers 
or spatial location), but not by the state of the relative value signal that drives the choice, or 
by the absolute or relative value of the attributes. This assumption is important because it 
implies that fluctuations in attention have a causal impact in the choice process, instead of 
being driven by it.  
 
Testing these assumptions about the orthogonality of attention directly is difficult as it 
requires having a measure of the relative value signal’s state before a choice is made, which 
is quite challenging to obtain, and because attention terminates at the end of the choice 
process, which can produce spurious correlations between attentional measures and 
attribute values. One way to address these issues is to carry out external manipulations of 
attention, as we report in the final two experiments below. However, since these 
  
50 
manipulations also have limitations, we finished the analysis of Experiment 1 by 
carrying out an indirect test of the orthogonality of attention.  
 
The logic of the test is as follows. From the choice data, we know that the attribute values 
are correlated with the likelihood of choosing the patient option. Under the maintained 
hypothesis that choices are compatible with a sequential integration model, this implies 
that, on average, each of these variables should also be correlated with the state of the 
integrator across trials. Thus, if fixations were driven mostly by the state of the relative 
value signal, one would expect a strong association between the relative fixations and the 
attribute parameters across trials. Table S3 reports the results of this test. Importantly, in all 
cases the magnitude of the effects were quite small in size, contrary to what would be 
expected if attention were guided mostly by the state of the relative value signal, or by the 
relative value of the attributes. To quantify this, Table S3 also reports an estimate of the 
effect size, or the maximum percentage change in attention to each ROI that can be 
induced, which are also found to be relatively small. 
 
Together, these analyses provide support for the hypothesis that some of the variation in 
attention is exogenous to the attribute values and to the comparison process used to make 
the choice. However, we emphasize that these tests cannot rule out the possibility that some 
of the attentional variation is endogenous, which highlights the importance of the last two 
experiments, where attention is manipulated exogenously. 
 
Experiments 2 & 3: Causal Tests 
  
51 
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrate that variation in relative attention can account 
for a sizable fraction of the differences in discount rates, both within and across individuals. 
However, despite the evidence suggesting that a sizable fraction of the variation of 
attention is exogenous, the tests are purely correlational, and cannot rule out the possibility 
that the direction of causality runs in the opposite direction. The last two experiments were 
designed to address this issue. 
 
Causal Test I. In Experiment 2 (see Figure 2 and SI Methods) we manipulated the relative 
attention paid to the different attributes and tested if this increased the likelihood that 
subjects made a patient choice. Here, subjects faced trials where they were forced to attend 
to the different attributes for a particular amount of time before they were allowed to enter 
their response. Relative attention was manipulated within subjects as each participant spent 
either more time fixating towards the amounts or more time fixating towards the delays 
depending on the trial. We manipulated exposure to amounts versus delays because the 
results of Experiment 1 suggest that this may affect patience, given the asymmetric impact 
of fixating on the immediate delay versus the other attributes. 
 
We carried out two separate analyses on the choice data. First, we compared choices in 
trials where amounts were displayed for longer than delays to choices in trials where delays 
were displayed for longer than amounts. In particular, we computed the number of patient 
choices and estimated the k discounting parameter separately for each subject and group of 
trials, and compared them using two-sided paired t-tests. We found that subjects made 42.9 
patient choices when amounts were displayed for longer than delays, and 41.3 patient 
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choices in the other case. This amounts to a small, but significant, 4% increase in the 
number of patient choices as the result of the exposure manipulation (p < 0.03). A similar 
result was found when we examined at the estimated discount rates: the estimated log(𝑘) is 
-5.66 when amounts are shown for longer than delays and -5.32 otherwise. Again, the 
effect is small, but significant (p < 0.04). The direction of these effects was consistent with 
the predictions made based on the findings of Experiment 1.  
 
Second, we carried out a similar analysis comparing the trials in which amounts were 
shown first to those trials in which delays appeared first. We did not find a significant order 
effect using either the percentage of patient choices (p = 0.40) or the estimated log(𝑘) (p = 
0.14) indicating that total fixation time may play a larger role than order of fixations. 
 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that changes in relative attention to 
different attributes have a causal impact on the ability to make patient choices and suggests 
that some of the within and cross individual differences in discount rates, identified in 
Experiment 1, are due to attentional variation.  
 
Causal Test II. While Experiment 2 found evidence that exogenously manipulating 
attention alters discounting, the effect was fairly small. One possible interpretation of the 
small effect size is that the relative deployment of attention is more endogenous than the 
previous literature and the previous discussion suggest. However, another possible 
interpretation is that carrying out meaningful manipulations of attention is hard, and that in 
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the previous experiment attention might not have varied as much across conditions as 
intended, perhaps because subjects made up their minds before the exposure time 
terminated. 
 
Experiment 3 was designed to address this issue (Figure 3 and SI Methods). Here, subjects 
were free to fixate between the immediate and delayed outcomes, but once a specified 
accumulation time had been reached for an option, where one option was always chosen to 
have a larger accumulation time than the other, it was removed from the computer screen. 
We still manipulated attention to certain features on the screen, but we sought to create an 
environment where fixation and behavioral patterns more closely matched those in 
Experiment 1. Furthermore, this design allows us to test for the presence of an option-based 
bias, rather than an attribute-based bias, as the within subject results from Experiment 1 
suggest the option-based bias may be dominant. 
 
We first verified that the experimental manipulation successfully biased fixations towards 
the target option. Subjects spent 1.14 seconds (SD = 0.08) fixating to the target option and 
0.30 seconds (SD = 0.00) fixating to the non-target option, indicating the manipulation was 
successful in altering relative attention, as measured by fixations.  
 
Next we compared behavior in this experiment to that in Experiment 1. Here, subjects 
made 2.7 fixations (SD = 0.6) between the options, meaning that they, on average, viewed 
each option more than once. Furthermore, subjects first looked left on 59% (SD = 29%) of 
the trials, but there was no relationship between whether they looked at the immediate or 
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delayed option first (p = 0.24). The average time spent on the trial before entering a 
response was 2.9 seconds (SD = 0.7), and only 10.5% of the trials terminated at the five-
second mark.  These results indicate that certain behavioral outcomes, particularly response 
times, were similar to those in Experiment 1. 
 
We then compared choices across the two attentional conditions and found a causal effect: 
when the immediate option was the target, subjects made 41.5 patient decisions, but when 
the delayed option was the target, subjects made 46.6 patient decisions. This difference of 
5.1 patient decisions is significant (t-test of difference, p < 0.01). The effect size appears 
quite large and suggests that the number of patient choices increases by 12.3 percent as 
attention is exogenously shifted away from the impatient and towards the patient option. 
Note that, as in experiment 1, the range of how patiently subjects chose in this experiment 
greatly varied (pooled across both conditions: minimum = 2.0%, maximum = 97.5%, mean 
= 44.0%, SD = 25.0%). Ultimately, this may lead to an underestimate of the effect size as 
subjects who have a preference to almost always choose the impatient, or patient, option 
may only have room to slightly alter behavior until they hit a barrier. 
 
Finally, we sought to quantify how the estimated k parameter changed as a result of the 
experimental manipulation. Since the choice pairs were designed so that subjects were 
close to indifferent between them, we do not have enough power to detect significant 
changes in the estimated k parameters in the data set (p = 0.175). Thus, in order to quantify 
how the estimated change in patience can translate to changes in k, we performed the 
following analysis. Given the mean estimated k from Experiment 1 we simulated choices 
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for 1000 experimental sessions, where each session consisted of the exact questions from 
Experiment 1. For each session, we drew a random number from the distribution of 
estimated effect sizes from Experiment 3, with replacement, and scaled that number to 
reflect the predicted effect size in the simulated data set. When the drawn effect size, d, was 
positive, we randomly chose d simulated patient choices to switch to impatient; when d was 
negative, we randomly chose d simulated impatient choices to switch to patient. Thus, we 
estimated how each drawn effect size would impact decisions if the effect size could be 
generalized to the choice set from Experiment 1. Next, we estimated k both before and after 
making these effect size changes and found the estimated k increased from 0.0089 to 
0.0115 (p < 0.01), which predicts a sizeable shift towards impatient behavior. To quantify, 
while subjects would have, on average, made 93.0 patient decisions, the estimated effect of 
the manipulation decreases this to 81.8 patient choices. Repeating this simulation exercise 
an additional 150 times shows these results are not outliers in the distribution of test 
statistics (Fig. S2). 
 
Discussion 
We have described the results of three experiments designed to test whether exogenous 
fluctuations in the relative attention paid to different features during intertemporal choices 
can influence the ability to delay gratification. Consistent with this hypothesis, we found 
shifting attention towards the delayed amount attribute was associated with a sizable 
increase in the likelihood of making a patient choice, whereas shifting attention towards the 
immediate delay attribute had a sizable effect in the opposite direction. Furthermore, cross-
trial variation in attention explained about 30% of subjects’ ability to choose the delayed 
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option and between 20% and 35% of individual differences in discount rates could be 
explained by individual differences in the average relative propensity to look at different 
ROIs.  
 
Since multiple alternative mechanisms are likely to affect the ability to delay gratification 
during intertemporal choice (26-28), we were surprised to find that between 20% and 35% 
of observed individual differences in self-control ability could be explained by differences 
in the deployment of relative attention. By comparison, previous studies have found that 
personality traits such as impulsivity or I.Q. can only explain around 13% and 5%, 
respectively, of individual differences in self-control (29-31). 
 
A critical question underlying our hypothesis is the direction of causality between the 
fluctuations of attention and the decision-making processes. The models that motivate our 
hypothesis, such as DFT and the aDDM, assume observed fluctuations in attention are not 
driven by the state of the relative value signal that drives choice, or by the properties of the 
attributes. If this is correct, the results from Experiment 1 would suggest that a sizable 
fraction of the within and cross subject variation in discount rates is driven by fluctuations 
in attention. However, it is also possible to write simple variations of these models in which 
the state of the relative value signal has some influence on the deployment of attention, so 
that attributes that are “consistent” with the currently favored option are more likely to be 
fixated. Understanding how much of this variation can be causally attributed to attention is 
critical to evaluate the implications of our work. The analysis of the fixation data from 
Experiment 1 suggests there might be an influence from the choice process to the 
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deployment of attention, but the effect may be small. The results of Experiments 2 and 3, 
in which attention was manipulated exogenously, suggest that there is a causal effect from 
attention to intertemporal choice.  
 
We view the results here as demonstrating that there is a causal and sizable impact of 
variation in relative attention on choice. However, we emphasize that, in our view, it is 
likely that some of the differences in attention across trials and subjects is endogenous, 
especially later on in the course of a trial.  Designing clear measures of the exogenous and 
endogenous channels of influence, and how they evolve over the course of a decision, is a 
critical open question for future studies. 
 
Given the sizable differences in exposure time in Experiment 2, we were surprised by the 
small effect size. There are several potential explanations for this finding. First, it is 
possible that the direction of influence from fixations to choices runs in both directions, and 
that a sizable fraction of the correlations identified in Experiment 1 is due to an influence of 
perceived value on attention. Second, the experimental manipulation might have had a 
small impact on the actual relative processing of the attributes, as subjects may have made 
their decisions before the exposure was completed, which would lead to a reduced impact 
on choices. Disentangling these hypotheses is challenging, as it requires measuring the 
‘latent’ state of the choice process before a response is made, and to measure processing 
time by the decision-making circuitry without using fixations. Third, the task parameters 
were not optimized to generate the maximum possible effect; it is possible a different 
manipulation could have led to a more sizable effect.  
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Reasuringly, Experiment 3 shows that a larger causal effect takes place under an alternative 
attentional manipulation. Given the differences between Experiments 2 and 3, it is difficult 
to precisely pinpoint why Experiment 3 has a larger effect size than Experiment 2. For 
instance, it may be related to testing for an option versus attribute bias, differences in 
exposure time, or differences in the choice response process. It’s possible that altering any 
of these parameters in the experiment can lead to even larger effect sizes than those we 
observe. 
 
Our study builds upon and contributes to several literatures. First, it is related to the work 
on sequential-integration models by multiple groups, especially on the DDM (2-4), and to 
versions of these models illustrating that the dynamic computation and comparison of value 
is influenced by attention, like DFT (6-8), and the aDDM (11-13), which lead to systematic 
attentional biases. Our results also build on a pioneering set of papers that have used 
attentional measures to test algorithmic models of how preferences are constructed and 
compared at the time of decision (32-35) as well as others that investigate how evidence 
accumulation can change throughout the choice process (36-37). The association between 
attention and contextual effects has also been used to explain preference reversals (38, 7-8), 
and context effects in risky choice (20, 35). Our paper’s contribution to this existing work 
is to show that these ideas extend to the domain of intertemporal choice, and that 
attentional variation could potentially be a critical variable in explaining differences in the 
ability to delay gratification across individuals and contexts. An important direction for 
future research in this area is to carry out experiments that allow for more quantitative 
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model fitting and testing, including a formal comparison of the various types of 
attentional biases that have been proposed by different types of models. This could not be 
done with the current design, as it requires decorrelating the different attributes and a larger 
number of trials. However, previous applications using the DDM, the aDDM, and other 
sequential integrator models have demonstrated the potential of this approach. 
 
Second, our results build on a large body of work which has shown that individuals seem to 
exhibit hyperbolic discounting in intertemporal choice, which can lead to difficulties in 
delaying gratification when one of the options entail an immediate reward (1, 22-23, 39). 
One critical finding in this literature is that discount rates are not constant, and instead 
decrease with distance to the present. The results of Experiment 1 show that shifts in 
attention towards the immediate delay attribute had an especially strong impact on discount 
rates. This suggests that some of the ‘hyperbolicity’ of the discount function might be 
attributable to attentional effects, and might be more sensitive to training and context than 
‘deeper’ preference parameters.  
 
Third, our results have implications for how to design interventions that could increase 
people’s ability to postpone gratification, as well as important implications for marketing. 
In particular, they suggest that any contextual variable, or ‘nudge,’ that directs attention 
towards the long-term benefits of self-control, and away from the immediate rewards, 
might improve self-control. This is consistent with previous work that has found directing 
attention towards the health attributes of foods, and away from their taste, increases an 
individual’s ability to make healthy dietary choices (40). Furthermore, previous studies 
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have found that changes in the low level visual features of stimuli can affect the relative 
attention they receive, and through it the likelihood that they are selected (15). A systematic 
investigation of these possibilities in the domain of intertemporal choice is an important 
open question for future research.  
 
Methods 
Participants. Twenty subjects participated in Experiment 1, thirty-three participated in 
Experiment 2, and twenty-one participated in Experiment 3. All subjects were Caltech 
students or Pasadena/Los Angeles community members and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision with the use of contact lenses. Caltech’s Institutional Review Board 
approved all studies. 
 
Tasks. Subjects completed various intertemporal decision making tasks where they chose 
between receiving some amount of money later that day, i.e. “today,” and some amount of 
money on a future date as their eye movements were recorded (SI Methods). For their 
participation, they received a $5 show-up fee plus payment for one intertemporal choice 
question, chosen at random and implemented through PayPal. All experiments contained at 
least 200 trials. 
 
See the SI for a more detailed description of the Methods. 
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ROI Coefficient Estimates 
Constant 1.15* -1.96* 1.12* -0.65 
(0.34) (0.32) (0.33) (0.38) 
Immediate Amount -3.53* - - - 
(0.80) - - - 
Delayed Amount - 5.74* - - 
- (0.74) - - 
Immediate Delay - - -10.80* - 
- - (1.16) - 
Delayed Delay - - - 3.40* 
- - - (0.56) 
Mean Effect Size 0.16 0.27 0.35 0.15 
 
 
Table 1. 
 
Each column reports the results of a logistic mixed-model regression where an indicator 
variable for making a patient choice was regressed on a constant and the percentage of time 
spent fixating on the ROI of interest. Mean effect sizes denote the predicted effect of 
shifting relative attention towards each attribute, from the 10th to the 90th percentile. 
* denotes significance at the 1% level 
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A. Fraction Patient 
Constant -0.71 0.58 -0.05 0.99 - 
(0.56) (0.47) (0.59) (0.14) - 
Delayed Amount 3.37* - - - 0.03 
(1.51) - - - (1.44) 
Delayed Delay - -0.16 - - 2.04 
- (2.05) - - (1.53) 
Immediate Amount - - 1.96 - 1.61 
- - (1.92) - (1.46) 
Immediate Delay - - - -4.43** -4.18** 
- - - (1.28) (1.56) 
R2 0.22 0.00 0.05 0.40 0.89 
B. Estimated log(k) 
Constant 0.05 -5.41* -2.91 -7.42 - 
(2.71) (2.21) (2.79) (0.67) - 
Delayed Amount -14.79
+ - - - -2.70 
(7.26) - - - (7.03) 
Delayed Delay - -0.14 - - -12.97 
- (9.71) - - (7.48) 
Immediate Amount - - -8.33 - -10.29 
- - (9.14) - (7.10) 
Immediate Delay - - - 19.80** 16.12
+ 
- - - (6.26) (7.63) 
R2 0.19 0.00 0.04 0.36 0.97 
 
Table 2 
 
Each column reports the results of a linear regression where subject-specific measures of 
patient (top = mean fraction of patient decisions, bottom = estimated log(k)) were regressed 
on the average fraction of time that each subject spent attending to particular ROIs. The 
slopes and constants from each regression are reported, with standard errors below in 
parentheses.   
** Significant at the 1% level, * Significant at the 5% level, +Significant at the 6% level. 
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Figure 1 
 
Trial structure for Experiment 1. Every trial, subjects first stared at the central fixation 
cross for 500ms. Afterwards, the choice set was revealed and subjects had as long as they 
liked to make a choice between an option to be received today and an option to be received 
at some future date. Eye fixations were recorded at this point. After entering a response, 
subjects saw feedback for 1 second, and then moved to the next trial. 
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Figure 2 
 
Design for Experiment 2. (A) Trial structure for choice task in Experiment 2. Choices 
consisted of questions they should be close to indifferent between. First, subjects fixated on 
a central fixation cross for 500 ms. Next, they saw a pair of screens that alternated for a 
fixed length of time, depending on which of the four conditions was implemented. After 
switching between the two screens for a minimum of 5s, subjects were shown a question 
mark and had as long as they liked to enter a choice, but could only enter their response 
once they saw the question mark. Afterwards, feedback was shown for 1 second, and 
subjects continued to the next trial. (B) Exposure structure for the four different conditions. 
Both the length that each screen appeared as well as its order was varied. Each 
experimental cell repeated itself in each trial so that the total exposure time was not less 
than 5 seconds, and could last longer depending on whether the subject fixated to the 
options on the screen. 
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Figure 3 
 
Trial structure for the choice task in Experiment 3. Choices consisted of questions they 
should be close to indifferent between. First, subjects fixated on a central fixation cross for 
500 ms. Next, they saw both choice options presented and were free to fixate between 
them. One option was randomly designated the target, and the other was the non-target. 
Once the target (non-target) option was fixated at for 1.2 (0.3) seconds, it disappeared from 
the screen leaving only the non-target (target) visible. Then, once the non-target (target) 
option was attended to for a total of 0.3 (1.2) seconds, it also disappeared and a question 
mark appeared in the center of the screen. This was the subject’s cue to enter their response 
and after doing so, feedback was shown and they continued to the next trial. 
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SI: Methods 
Experiment 1  
Task. Subjects completed 216 trials of an intertemporal monetary choice task. In each trial, 
subjects first viewed a fixation cross at the center of the screen and were asked to fixate on 
it for 500ms. Compliance was monitored with the eye tracker, so that the trial proceeded to 
the next stage only after 500 ms of continuous fixation. The duration of the initial fixation 
was enforced to ensure that subjects began every choice trial by fixating at the center of the 
screen. Next, subjects were shown a choice screen in which they had to make a decision 
between receiving a smaller, sooner monetary reward and a larger, later alternative. 
Subjects had as long as they needed to make a decision and indicated their choice by 
pressing either the left or right buttons on a keyboard with their dominant hand. 
Afterwards, subjects saw a 1 second feedback screen depicting their choice. Trials were 
separated by a 1 second black screen.  
 
At the end of the experiment, one trial was selected at random and the subject’s choice for 
that trial was implemented. This trial was determined by having the subject pick a random 
number out of an envelope. While determining the payments, subjects completed a short 
questionnaire. To minimize differences in transaction costs or credibility between 
immediate and delayed payments, choices were implemented via PayPal, with payments 
sent at the appropriate delay. In addition, regardless of the delay, subjects received an email 
at the time their PayPal account had been credited. 
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The choice screens were constructed as follows. Monetary amounts (range: $17-$60) 
always appeared at the top of the screen, while the delays (range: 0-200 days) always 
appeared at the bottom. Each trial included an immediate option with a delay of 0 days, 
which was labeled as “today.” The other delay was given as “X days,” where X ranged 
from 7-200. The size of the delayed amount was always constrained to be at least as large 
as the immediate amount. The order of the questions was randomized for each subject. The 
location (left or right) for the immediate and delayed options was randomized every trial.  
 
Eye tracking. Eye movements were recorded at 50 Hz using a Tobii X50 desktop-mounted 
eye tracker. The eye tracker recorded throughout the choice task and produced a time series 
consisting of fixation locations for both right and left eyes at every time point. Subjects 
were required to keep their dominant hand on the response buttons throughout the task. 
This was done to eliminate eye movements related to the motor implementation of the 
choice, as opposed to the choice process, which is our object of interested. 
 
We focus our analyses on the fixation locations during the choice screens. In particular, we 
measure the amount of time during choice that is spent looking at each of the four regions-
of-interest (ROIs): immediate amount, immediate date, delayed amount, and delayed date. 
To do this, we define four boxes that add ten percent of the screen size, in pixels, around 
each of the ROIs, centered at the location of the associated text. The text for the ROIs was 
centered at locations (171, 120), (171, 598), (853, 120), and (853, 598) (coordinates in 
pixels based on a screen resolution of 1024x718). We then used the eye tracking data to 
measure which ROI, if any, was fixated at 20 milliseconds intervals during the choice.  
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Due to eye tracker and behavioral noise, some fixation data is missing. We deal with these 
missing fixations as follows. When a missing fixation was recorded between fixations to 
the same item, those missing fixations are changed to fixations to that item. For instance, 
the fixation pattern “upper right, missing, upper right” would become “upper right, upper 
right, upper right.” The assumption here is that the missing fixation corresponds to an eye 
blink or a temporary loss of eye location by the eye tracker. However, if the missing 
fixation occurred between fixations to different items, or at the beginning or end of the trial, 
those fixations are treated as missing data. So, the pattern “upper right, missing, upper left” 
would drop the missing fixations from the analysis. In this case, the assumption is that the 
subject made a saccade from one ROI into another, and some data was lost during this 
transition. 
 
For every subject and trial, we computed the amount of time spent looking at one of the 
four ROIs. We then determined the relative time spent looking at each ROI by dividing the 
time spent looking at each ROI by the total time spent looking at all four ROIs for every 
trial.  
 
Experiment 2 
Task. The experiment consisted of two parts. In Part I, subjects performed a forty trial 
version of the choice task in Experiment 1, without any attentional manipulation. The goal 
of this part was to estimate a subject-specific discount rate that was then used to construct a 
choice set that the subject made decisions over in Part II. In particular, we constructed forty 
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new choice questions for Part II such that the immediate amount varied between $18 and 
$27, the immediate delay was always “today,” and the delayed date was in the set of {7, 14, 
21, 30, 40, 60, 90, 180} days. The first two attributes were chosen randomly, and then the 
delayed amount was selected (using only integer monetary amounts) to generate questions 
in which the subject was as close as possible to being indifferent between choosing the 
immediate or delayed option, given the estimated k for the subject. 
 
In Part II subjects encountered each choice problem four times, in random order, for a total 
of 160 trials. In each trial subjects first viewed a fixation cross at the center of the screen 
and were asked to fixate on it for 500ms. The trial would only proceed once they had done 
so. Next, we exogenously varied visual attention to the amounts and delays by alternating 
between two display screens: one screen depicted only the amounts and the second 
depicted only the delays. In all screens, the two attributes were displayed next to each other 
in order to facilitate processing them in parallel. Each of the forty questions appeared in all 
four conditions, which varied both the relative exposure to amounts and delays, as well as 
the order in which they appear. The length of the exposures was enforced by the eye tracker 
so that, for example, in trials in which amounts appeared for longer than delays, the screen 
would not advance until the subject had looked at amounts for a total of 2 seconds. Eye 
movements were monitored at either 250 or 500 Hz, using a desktop mounted SR Research 
Eyelink 1000.  
 
Every trial involved 5 seconds of enforced exposure, which allowed for two showings of 
each of the attributes, one for a total of 4 seconds and the other for a total of 1 second. 
  
73 
Afterwards, a question mark appeared, which cued subjects to enter a response by key 
press, just as in Experiment 1. After seeing feedback for one second, the task advanced to 
the next trial.  
 
Subjects were not informed that there were different types of trials. Instead, each subject 
took part in a short initial training round that consisted of 8 practice trials. They were 
informed that these practice questions would not count for payment, but were designed to 
ensure they understood the instructions for this part. The practice trials consisted of two 
questions from each of the four conditions, but with a different set of amounts and delays 
from those used in Part II.  
 
Subjects were allowed to take a short break every 25 trials. At the end of the task, they 
picked a number from 1-200 out of an envelope. This number corresponded to the single 
trial, from either Part I or II, that would be implemented. All payments were implemented 
as in Experiment 1. 
 
Remarks. Several features of the experiment are worth highlighting. First, given the sizable 
individual variation in discount rates, we used a within subjects design to increase 
statistical power. Second, we manipulated exposure to amounts versus delays because the 
results of Experiment 1 suggest that this may affect patience, given the asymmetric impact 
of fixating on the short delay versus the other attributes. Third, by manipulating the order 
of exposure, we control for the possibility of order effects. Finally, we emphasize that 
exposure need not be exactly equal to attention in this task. For example, subjects might 
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have made a choice before the end of the exposure cycle and thus, might not process the 
stimuli throughout the last part of the trial. Subjects might also have been distracted by the 
need to detect screen changes and move their eyes in response. As a result, there is 
uncertainty about the size of the relative attention difference that is generated by the 
different conditions. 
 
Experiment 3 
Task As in Experiment 2, the experiment consisted of two parts. Part I was identical to 
Experiment 2’s Part I. At the end of Part I, 100 new choice questions were constructed for 
Part II so that the subject would be close to indifferent in each choice. 
 
In Part II, subjects encountered each choice problem twice, in random order, for a total of 
200 trials. In each trial subjects first viewed a fixation cross at the center of the screen for 
500ms, which was enforced by the eye tracker. Next, the two choice options were 
displayed on the screen and subjects were free to look between them. Unbeknownst to the 
subjects, in each trial the computer selected one of the options to be the “target” and the 
other to be the “non-target.” Throughout the trial, the computer recorded the total duration 
that each option was attended to, and once an option reached its maximum fixation time, it 
disappeared from the screen. As one option must reach is maximum fixation time before 
the other, this resulted on having only one option was visible on the screen at this point. 
Once both options reached their maximum fixation time, or a total of 5 seconds since the 
start of the trial elapsed, a question mark appeared at the center of the screen and subjects 
were instructed to indicate their response as quickly as possible. The maximum fixation 
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time for the target option was 1.2 seconds and the maximum fixation time for the non-
target option was 0.3 seconds. In order to encourage subjects to respond immediately upon 
seeing the question mark, they were told that if in at least 190 out of the 200 trials they 
responded within 0.55 seconds of the question mark appearing they would receive an 
additional $5 at the end of the experiment. Eye movements were monitored at 500 Hz using 
a desktop mounted SR Research Eyelink 1000. 
 
Importantly, subjects were not informed that there were different types of trials. Instead, 
each subject took part in a short initial training round that consisted of 8 practice trials. 
They were informed that these practice questions would not count for payment, but were 
designed to ensure they understood the instructions for this part, and how to enter their 
responses. The practice trials consisted of four questions from each of the two conditions, 
but with a different set of amounts and delays from those used in Part II. No information 
regarding their response speed was provided. 
 
Subjects were allowed to take a short break every 25 trials. At the end of the task, they 
picked a number from 1-240 out of an envelope. This number corresponded to the single 
trial, from either Part I or II, that would be implemented. All payments were implemented 
as in the previous sections. 
 
Remarks: Two features of the experiment are worth highlighting. First, whereas 
Experiment 2 found evidence that differential attention to amounts and delays could lead to 
choice biases, this experiment sought to test whether differential attention to the options 
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could induce choice biases. Additionally, in this task the time from choice onset to 
decision more closely approximates the time it would take to make a choice without any 
experimenter attention manipulation. Subjects saw the options for a maximum total of 1.5 
seconds, and were encouraged to enter their responses quickly after.  
 
Estimating Discount Rates 
We use two different measures of the intertemporal discount rate. First, for every subject 
we compute the fraction of time the delayed option was chosen, which we refer to as a 
patient choice.  
 
Second, for each subject we estimated the discount rate that best explains the choice data 
using a hyperbolic model. We use the method proposed in Chabris et al. (2008), which is 
frequently used in the literature. The method assumes that subjects make choices by 
computing a value for each option and then comparing them. The value of receiving $𝑌 in 𝐷 days is assumed to be !!!!", where 𝑘 is a discount parameter controlling the subject’s 
patience: a low 𝑘 signifies patient decision-making, and a large 𝑘 signifies impatient 
behavior. Subjects then choose the delayed option with probability 
 
! !"!!!"!!"!! !"!!!", 
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where X is the monetary amount offered in the immediate option. The parameter 𝜔 
controls the amount of the noise in the choice process: choices are fully random when 𝜔 = 0, and their sensitivity to value differences increases with 𝜔. For every subject, we 
used maximum likelihood estimation to estimate the 𝑘 and 𝜔 parameters that best explain 
the choice data.  
 
Note that in many analyses entailing our estimates of k, we choose to analyze the logarithm 
of k, rather than k itself. We do this as a result of the functional form of the hyperbolic 
discounting model. When k is relatively low, small changes in k can produce large changes 
in decisions; yet when k is large, the same size changes will produce less noticeable 
decision alterations. Note that if the MLE estimate of k was 0, we used 0.0001 as the 
estimate when computing log(k) in the previous analysis. 
 
In Experiment 1, we used the estimated k parameter for each subject to compute trial 
specific measures of the value of the sooner option (Vsooner), the value of the delayed option 
(Vlater), the relative value of the patient option (Vdiff = Vlater - Vsooner), and the difficulty as 
measured by the absolute value of Vdiff. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
78 
Total Fixation Time to Each ROI 
A. Spatial 
 
Left Right 
 
Up 34.4 33.1 67.4 (3.4) (4.2) 5.4 
Down 17.0 15.6 32.6 (3.7) (2.3) (5.4) 
 
51.4 48.6  
 
(3.8) (3.8)  
B. Feature of Interest 
 
Immediate Delayed 
 
Amount 30.3 37.1 67.4 (3.2) (3.7) (5.4) 
Delay 10.0 22.6 32.6 (3.9) (3.1) (5.4) 
 
40.3 59.7  
 
(4.0) (4.0)  
C. Standard Deviation 
Amount 10.5 11.6  (2.0) (2.3) 
 
Delay 8.4 10.0  (1.6) (2.2) 
  
 
Table S1 
 
Total fixation time to each ROI. (A) The mean percent of total fixation time that was spent 
attending to each region of interest split by the spatial orientation of the screen: columns are 
horizontal orientation and rows are vertical orientation. (B) The mean percent of total 
fixation time that was spent attending to each region of interest split by feature of interest: 
columns are the immediate and delayed options and rows are monetary amounts and delay 
dates. Means are taken over subject-specific means, and standard deviations reported below 
in parentheses. (C) Reports the mean standard deviation over subjects from (B). Means are 
taken over subject-specific standard deviations, and standard deviations appear below in 
parentheses. 
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Percent of First Fixations to Each ROI 
A. Spatial 
 
Left Right 
 
Up 68.8 24.5 93.3 (24.1) (23.0) (6.2) 
Down 5.0 1.6 6.6 (5.0) (1.8) (6.2) 
 
73.8 26.2  
 
(23.9) (23.9)  
B. Feature of Interest 
 
Immediate Delayed 
 
Amount 45.3 48.0 93.3 (3.3) (4.9) (6.2) 
Delay 2.0 4.7 6.6 (2.2) (4.2) (6.2) 
 
47.3 52.6  
  (2.5) (2.5)  
 
Table S2 
 
Percent of first fixations to each ROI. (A) The mean percent of first fixations that were 
made to each region of interest split by the spatial orientation of the screen: columns are 
horizontal orientation and rows are vertical orientation. (B) The mean percent of first 
fixations that were spent attending to each region of interest split by feature of interest: 
columns are the immediate and delayed options and rows are monetary amounts and delay 
dates. Means are taken over subject-specific means, and standard deviations reported below 
in parentheses. 
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Impact of Attribute Values of Attention 
 
Immediate 
Amount 
Delayed 
Amount 
Immediate 
Delay 
Delayed 
Delay 
Constant 0.245 0.386 0.128 0.241 19.15 26.52 8.96 17.74 
Immediate 
Amount 
0.004 -0.004 0.003 -0.003 
6.58 -5.98 5.82 -5.60 
4.1% -4.0% 3.3% -3.3% 
Delayed Amount 
-0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.002 
-4.52 7.53 -8.02 5.47 
-4.2% 10.2% -12.5% 6.5% 
Delayed Date 
0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
3.83 -4.37 -0.77 1.62 
2.2% 2.7% 0.3% 0.9% 
 
 
Table S3 
 
Each column reports the results of a linear mixed-effects regression. In each case, the 
dependent variable was the fraction of time attending to the ROI, and the independent 
variables were a constant, the immediate monetary amount offered, the delayed monetary 
amount offered, and the delayed date. For each independent variable, coefficients and t-
statistics from the regression are reported in the first two rows for each coefficient. For all 
independent variables, excluding the constant, a measure of effect size appears in bold in 
the third row. This effect size measures the average change in the fraction of time attending 
to each ROI, as the corresponding variable increases from the minimum amount shown to 
subjects to the maximum amount shown to subjects. 
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Figure S1 
 
Relationship between log of the estimated k from the hyperbolic discounting model, plotted 
on the x-axis, and the fraction of patient choices, plotted on the y-axis, where each point on 
the graph corresponds to a different subject. 
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Figure S2  
 
Histogram depicting effect size differences in the simulation exercise from Experiment 3. 
The x-axis depicts the difference between then mean estimated k after altering choices by 
randomly drawn effect sizes (k New) and the mean estimated k before such an exercise 
took place (k Original). The blue vertical line depicts the mean over all 150 times 
completing this simulation while the red vertical line depicts the statistics from the first 
time this was done, as described in the main text. 
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C h a p t e r  3  
SYMMETRY IN COLD-TO-HOT AND HOT-TO-COLD VALUATION GAPS 
 
 
It is well known that the utility, or value, derived from consumption is modulated by 
emotional and physiological states at the time of consumption. For example, the pleasure of 
drinking water is larger when thirsty than when quenched. One basic question is whether 
individuals anticipate the effect of these “visceral” states in their utility when making 
decisions about future consumption. For instance, can a hungry grocery shopper buy the 
correct amount of food to consume throughout the week? A sizable body of evidence has 
shown that individuals in a “cold” state (e.g., satiated) systematically underestimate the 
increase in consumption value that they would experience in a “hot” state (e.g., hungry) 
(Badger et al., 2007; D. T. Gilbert, Gill, & Wilson, 2002; George Loewenstein, Nagin, & 
Paternoster, 1997; Nisbett & Kanouse, 1968; Sayette, Loewenstein, Griffin, & Black, 2008; 
Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003). This phenomena is known as a cold-to-hot empathy gap 
in psychology (G. Loewenstein, 1996), and as a projection bias in behavioral economics 
(G. Loewenstein, O'Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003).  
 
Empathy gaps can arise in two different scenarios. Cold-to-hot gaps refer to situations like 
forecasting the value of eating a hamburger in a hungry state, while being satiated at the 
time of decision. Hot-to-cold gaps refer to the opposite situation; like forecasting the value 
of eating dessert at the end of the meal in a satiated state, while being hungry at the time of 
decision. An important open question is whether both types of gaps are symmetric in the 
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following ways. First, do individuals underestimate their change in preferences to the 
same degree when going from cold-to-hot as when going from hot-to-cold?  Second, are 
symmetric mechanisms at work in generating both types of empathy gaps?  
 
The answer to these questions matters for several reasons. First, they inform our beliefs 
about the likelihood that individuals make mistakes of similar magnitude in both types of 
situations, as well as the extent to which both type of mistakes can be addressed with 
similar policy instruments. Second, theories in behavioral economics and psychology have 
posited that cold-to-hot and hot-to-cold gaps are symmetric and driven by similar 
mechanisms, but this has not been previously tested. 
 
Previous work has provided strong evidence for the existence of empathy gaps, but has not 
provided a definite answer to either of the two symmetry questions. In fact, the vast 
majority of experimental studies have focused on the cold-to-hot case (Badger et al., 2007; 
D. T. Gilbert et al., 2002; George Loewenstein et al., 1997; Nisbett & Kanouse, 1968; 
Sayette et al., 2008; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003). One important exception is (Read 
& van Leeuwen, 1998), which like us, compares hungry-satiated and satiated-hungry 
empathy gaps in real food choice. However, unlike us, their methodology does not permit a 
direct comparison of the extent to which changes in utility are underestimated in both 
cases. With respect to the second question, as far as we know, no previous experiments 
have investigated the mechanisms at work in projection bias, nor the extent to which they 
are symmetric. 
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Methods 
Subjects. 101 Caltech students took part in two behavioral sessions. In order to encourage 
participants to return for the second session, subjects were paid $10 after the first session 
and $40 after the second. The experiment was approved by Caltech’s Institutional Review 
Board. 
 
Stimuli. Each subject saw two different food sets, each containing 50 different snacks. 
These snacks consisted of a variety of candies, fruits, chips, and energy bars. Subjects saw 
one set of foods in the first session, and a different set in the second. The identity of the sets 
was determined randomly for each subject. We used two different sets to avoid consistency 
biases in the tasks described below. All of the foods received a mean neutral-to-appetitive 
rating in previous experiments. 
 
Task. The experiment consistend of two sessions that occurred at the same time of day, but 
were separated by 3 to 5 days. Fig. 1A provides a summary of the events in the experiment 
and Fig. 1B provides details on the timing of a typical trial for each of the tasks. In each 
session, subjects completed four tasks in the order specified below.  
 
First, subjects performed a liking-rating task in which they rated how much they wanted to 
eat each of the 50 snacks at the end of the session (scale: integers from -2 to 2, “How much 
would you enjoy that particular food at the end of TODAY’s experiment?”). The purpose 
of these ratings was to familiarize the subjects with the entire set of foods prior to the main 
bidding task. 
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Second, subjects entered bids for the right to eat each of the foods at the end of the second 
day of data collection, and were explicitly told whether they would be hungry or satiated at 
that time. Bids were entered by pressing a button and could take integer values from $0 to 
$4. Subjects bid on each food twice. At the beginning of the experiment they were 
informed that at the end of the second session they would need to remain in the lab for 20 
minutes, and the only thing that they would be able to eat was whatever they purchased 
from us through their bids. At the end of day 2, one of the trials (from either date) was 
selected and implemented using the rules of a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) auction 
(Becker, DeGroot, & Marschak, 1964).1 Subjects were given $4 in bidding cash and kept 
whatever they did not spend. The bids provide a measure of the perceived value at the time 
of decision for eating the food at the end of session 2.  
 
Third, subjects provided taste ratings (scale: integers from -2 to 2, “How tasty you believe 
that food to be, independent of any health considerations”) and health ratings (scale: 
integers from -2 to 2, “How healthy you believe that food to be, independent of any taste 
considerations”) for each of the foods. The ratings were collected in blocks, with the order 
randomized across subjects. These ratings provide a measure of the perceived attributes of 
each food at the time of decision.  
 
                                                
1 Briefly, the rules are as follows. Let b be the bid entered by the subject, and let n be a randomly selected number. If b>=n, the 
subject gets to eat the snack shown in that trial and only pays $n for it. If b < n, the subject gets nothing and pays nothing. 
We used this procedure because in is incentive compatible (i.e., the best strategy for the subjects is to bid their true value for 
the items), a fact that was emphasized during the training period. 
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As shown in Fig. 1C, the experiment had a 2x2 factorial design, with conditions varying 
across subjects. In each date we exogenously manipulated subjects’ hunger by asking them 
to fast for 4 hours prior to the experiment (hungry), or to eat a large snack within half an 
hour prior to the start of the experiment (satiated). This led to four treatment groups: 
satiated-hungry (SH), satiated-satiated (SS), hungry-satiated (HS), and hungry-hungry 
(HH). The first dimension denotes whether subjects were hungry or satiated during the first 
session. The second dimension denotes whether subjects were hungry or satiated during the 
second session. The experiment consisted of 23 subjects in group SH, 27 in group SS, 27 in 
group HS, and 24 in group HH. Before entering the lab, subjects were verbally asked to 
report the last time they ate. If they gave an answer inconsistent with the instructions, they 
were excluded from further participation in the experiment (and not reported in the 
analyses). We use the following notation to simplify the description of the results. XYN 
denotes date N = {1,2} for condition XY = {HH, SS, SH, HS}. 
 
Results 
Paradigm validation. Fig. 2 summarizes the bidding data for all of the conditions. Note 
that, in each date, the bids provide a measure of the perceived value of eating a snack at the 
end of the second session. The data illustrates several points. First, subjects bid consistently 
in both dates when there were no changes in the state (HH1 vs HH2: p > 0.84, SS1 vs SS2: 
p > 0.57; paired two-tailed t-tests).  
 
Second, the bids at date 2 did not depend on the state in date 1 (HH2 vs SH2: p > 0.80, SS2 
vs. HS2: p > 0.90; two-tailed t-tests). This implies that subjects bid the same amount in date 
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2 when they were in the same state, regardless whether their state at the time of the first 
bid was the same or different. In addition, we found no difference between the mean bid in 
SH2 and the average of HH1 and HH2 (p > .82, two-sided t-test), or between HS2 and the 
average of SS1 and SS2 (p > .97, two-sided t-test). For this reason, in some of the analyses 
below we pool the 8 bidding conditions into four cases: no-gap hungry (HH1, HH2, and 
SH2), no-gap satiated (SS1, SS2, HS2), hungry-satiated gap (HS1), and satiated-hungry 
gap (SH1).2 Note that we pool the conditions HH1, HH2 and SH2 together, and call them 
the no-gap hungry case, because in all of those cases subjects are making decisions in a 
hungry state about what to consume in date 2 also in a hungry state. Analogously, we refer 
to the conditions SS1, SS2, and HS2 as the no-gap satiated case because subjects in all of 
those instances make decisions in a satiated state about consumption in date 2 in a satiated 
state. 
 
Third, bids in the no-gap hungry case were on average 62 cents larger than in the no-gap 
satiated case (p < 0.01, two-tailed t-test), which demonstrates that our state manipulation 
affected subjects’ food values.  
  
Symmetric empathy gap. As shown in Fig. 2, we found a cold-to-hot (SH2 – SH1 = $0.19 ± 
0.08; p < 0.018, two sided t-test) and a hot-to-cold empathy gap (HS2 – HS1 = -$0.20 ± 
0.08; p < 0.016, two-sided t-test). The value difference is positive in the cold-hot case 
because subjects underestimate the value of eating when hungry when making decisions in 
                                                
2 To form the no-gap cases, we first averaged responses within conditions with the same subjects (e.g., average HH1 and HH2), 
and then averaged responses from the third group (e.g., SH2). 
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a satiated state. The opposite is true in the hot-cold case. A direct comparison revealed 
no differences between the magnitudes of both mistakes, which is consistent with a 
symmetric effect size for both types of value gaps (|SH2 - SH1| vs. |HS2 – HS1|: p > 0.92, 
two-sided t-test). 
 
The next set of results is about the mechanisms at work in the empathy gaps, and the extent 
to which they work symmetrically in the two directions. We hypothesized that the mistakes 
in value forecasting could operate through three different mechanisms.  
 
First, subjects might change their perception of the attributes of foods, such as how healthy 
or how tasty they are. For example, they might perceive junk foods to be healthier when 
making decisions in a hungry state. We refer to this channel as the attribute perception 
mechanism. We can test for this mechanism by comparing the distribution of taste and 
health ratings provided in the different conditions. 
 
Second, hunger might increase the baseline value of all foods, regardless of their attributes. 
This would show up as a constant shift in the value of the foods. We refer to this channel as 
the baseline value mechanism. We can test for it by estimating a linear regression, for each 
subject and session, of the bids on the taste and health ratings, and then comparing the 
distribution of estimated constants. 
 
Third, hunger might change how a food’s attributes are weighted in computing its value. 
We refer to this channel as the attribute weighting mechanism. We can test for it using the 
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same linear regression described above and comparing the distribution of estimated 
coefficients for the health and taste ratings. 
 
Symmetric attribute perception mechanism. We tested for the role of this mechanism by 
comparing the mean taste and health ratings across the four cases: satiated no-gap, HS1, 
SH1, and hungry no-gap. We pooled the data this way to increase the statistical power of 
our tests. This is justified by the fact that, since there were no differences in the bids within 
each of the four cases, the mechanisms are also likely to be deployed in a similar way 
within each case. As shown in Table 1, we found that taste ratings were higher in HS1 than 
in the satiated no-gap case (HS1: 0.53 ± 0.07; satiated no-gap: 0.32 ± 0.05; p < 0.02, two-
sided t-test). This is consistent with the idea that subjects in a hungry state overestimate the 
degree to which they will perceive the snacks as tasty when satiated. However, we did not 
find a difference between the SH1 and the hungry no-gap case (SH1: 0.37 ± 0.10; hungry 
no-gap: 0.50 ± 0.07; p < 0.27, two-sided t-test), although the sign of the difference is in the 
predicted direction, and the effect size is similar to the previous one. There were also no 
significant differences for health ratings. Together, this provides partial support for the 
hypothesis that the attribution perception mechanism is at work, and suggests that hunger 
affected the perception of the more “visceral” taste attributes, but not the perception of the 
more “cognitive” health attributes. 
 
Symmetric baseline value and attribute weighting mechanisms. We tested for the role of 
these two mechanisms by estimating a linear mixed regression model. We regressed the 
amount bid on an indicator variable for each case (satiated no-gap, HS1, SH1, and hungry 
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no-gap), as well as an interaction of each indicator with health and taste ratings. Random 
slopes were fit for each subject.3  
 
The estimates are reported in Table 2. A comparison of the constants shows that that they 
exhibited a pattern similar to the bids, by underestimating the extent to which their value 
changes from the state at the time of bid to the state at the time of consumption. In 
particular, the constant in HS1 estimates a baseline value for consumption that is 11 cents 
higher than the satiated no-gap case, while the constant in SH1 estimates a baseline value 
13 cents lower than the hungry no-gap case. This suggests that the baseline value effect was 
symmetric, which we tested by estimating a linear contrast of the distribution of estimated 
constants (with weights -1.5, -0.5, 0.5, 1.5 from left-to-right columns of Table 2;  p < 0.01). 
A comparison of the taste coefficients reveals a similar pattern: a linear test of the taste 
coefficients suggests that the attribute weighting mechanism is symmetric in the case of 
taste (similar weights, p < 0.01). In contrast, a similar test found no significant differences 
for the health coefficients (p > 0.28). Together, these results suggest that both the baseline 
value and the attribute mechanism are at work in a symmetric fashion. Furthermore, it 
suggests the attribute weighting mechanism changes the valuation of the more “visceral” 
taste ratings, but not the valuation of the more “cognitive” health ratings. 
 
Predicting cross-individual differences in empathy gaps. We carried out an additional post-
hoc analysis to further test the validity of the mechanism results. We reasoned that if the 
                                                
3 Responses for subjects in the same experimental condition in the no-gap cases were equally weighted, since subjects saw 
different foods on each day. 
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identified mechanisms play a critical role in generating the empathy gaps, they should be 
correlated with cross-subject differences of the magnitude of the empathy gaps. To test this, 
we used the data from the HS and SH conditions to estimate a linear regression of an 
individual measure of the empathy gaps (given by mean bid in day 2 minus mean bid in 
day 1) on a measure of the individual taste perception effects (given by mean taste rating in 
day 2 minus taste rating in day 1), a measure of the individual baseline value effects (given 
by the estimated constant in day 2 minus the estimated constant in day 1, for each subject), 
and the taste attribute weighting effects (given by the estimated taste coefficient in day 2 
minus the estimated taste coefficient in day 1, for each subject). The regression took into 
account the potential of measurement error on the independent variables, since they were 
estimated from linear regressions at the individual level. As shown in Table 3, we found 
that the size of the empathy gap was significantly correlated with the size of changes in our 
three relevant mechanisms. These results provide additional evidence in favor of the 
mechanism results described above. 
 
Discussion 
We carried out a modified version of the classic experiment by Read and van Leeuwen in 
order to address the following two basic open questions. First, do individuals incorrectly 
predict their change in preferences to the same degree when going from cold-to-hot as 
when going from hot-to-cold? Second, are symmetric mechanisms at work in generating 
both types of empathy gaps? 
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With respect to the first question, we found that the size of the empathy gap was 
symmetric: satiated individuals underestimated the value of foods to consume when hungry 
by a similar amount that hungry individuals overestimated the value of foods to consume 
when satiated. This provides support for the types of decision-making models proposed in 
the projection bias literature (Conlin, O'Donoghue, & Vogelsang, 2007; G. Loewenstein et 
al., 2003). In addition, this result suggests that both types of gaps lead to decision-making 
mistakes of similar magnitude, and thus ought to be of equal importance in public policy 
interventions. 
 
With respect to the second question, we found evidence that three different mechanisms are 
at work in generating the empathy gaps, and appear to operate largely symmetrically. First, 
we found that subjects increase their perception of the tastiness of food when making 
decisions while hungry, regardless of their state at the time of consumption (attribute 
perception mechanism). Second, we found that they overestimate the value of the average 
food in hot-to-cold gaps, and underestimate it in cold-to-hot gaps (baseline valuation 
mechanism). Finally, we found that they overweight the anticipated tastiness of foods in 
hot-cold gaps, and underweight it in cold-hold gaps (attribute weighting mechanism). 
 
Interestingly, the attribute perception and attribute weighting mechanisms seem to operate 
in the more “visceral” taste dimension, but not in the more “cognitive” health attribute. 
This suggests that changes in visceral states might lead to empathy gaps in part by 
changing how basic physiological attributes like taste are perceived and weighted, but that 
they do not affect how more abstract attributes like health are represented and weighted. 
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This is important because it suggests that one key to overcoming decision mistakes 
associated with empathy gaps may be to help individuals more accurately forecast these 
basic variables, instead of attempting to modulate representations of more abstract variables 
like health.  
 
Our findings are also related to the important literature on mistakes in affective forecasting 
(Daniel T Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatly, 1998; D. T. Gilbert & Wilson, 
2007; Riis, Loewenstein, Baron, & Jepson, 2005; Sackett & Torrance, 1978; Sieff, Dawes, 
& Loewenstein, 1999; Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000). A key 
difference between empathy gaps and the affective forecasting literature has to do with the 
types of values being forecasted and the mechanisms at work. In particular, much of the 
affective forecasting literature has focused on predicting the impact of current and future 
events on future well-being and mood, but not on decision-making per-se. In addition, a 
critical mechanism in many affective forecasting studies is an inability to forecast the speed 
at which visceral states change (e.g., how long will I be depressed after a divorce). In 
contrast, this mechanism is not part of the definition of empathy gaps, where subjects are 
assumed to know the future state, even if they cannot forecast their future utility properly. 
 
We conclude by emphasizing two limitations of the study. First, the type of empathy gap 
studied here is likely to be relatively mild compared to those that arise in domains like 
addiction (Badger et al., 2007; Sayette et al., 2008) or sexual arousal (George Loewenstein 
et al., 1997). It is conceivable that the symmetry identified here breaks down in those cases, 
a possibility that should be investigated in future studies. Second, the list of attributes used 
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in the study is far from comprehensive, and includes only taste and health, which lie in 
extreme positions of the visceral-cognitive spectrum. It is possible that there are attributes 
in the mid-part of the spectrum that also play a role in generating empathy gaps that we 
have not identified, even for the case of food choices. 
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Fig. 1. Experimental set-up. A) Subjects took part in 2 behavioral sessions, separated by 3-
5 days. In each session they made liking, health, and taste ratings. They also made bids 
over foods to consume at the end of session 2. Regardless of whether they bought food, 
participants were required to remain in the lab for 20 minutes after the second session. On 
each day, subjects completed tasks over a different set of foods that was randomized across 
subjects. B) Timing of the task. On a computer monitor, subjects saw a fixation cross for 
500ms before the trial food was revealed. After another 500ms, a white border disappeared 
and subjects had as long as they liked to give their rating/bid. Response feedback was 
provided for 1s before advancing to the next trial. C) The experiment consisted of four 
experimental conditions: hungry-hungry, hungry-satiated, satiated-hungry, and satiated-
satiated. 
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Fig. 2. Mean bids by condition and experimental session. Standard error bars are 
shown. 
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Table 1. Mean taste and health ratings by experimental condition. SDs reported in 
parentheses.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
	  
Satiated	   HS-­‐1	   SH-­‐1	   Hungry	  
	  
No-­‐Gap	   No-­‐Gap	  
Taste	  Rating	   0.32	   0.53	   0.37	   0.50	  
(0.36)	   (0.34)	   (0.49)	   (0.45)	  
Health	  
Rating	  
-­‐0.53	   -­‐0.50	   -­‐0.41	   -­‐0.42	  
(0.30)	   (0.31)	   (0.39)	   (0.34)	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Table 2. Estimates of a linear mixed regression model where the bid for each food 
was regressed on an indicator variable for each case (satiated no-gap, HS1, SH1, and 
hungry no-gap), as well as an interaction of each indicator variable with health and 
taste ratings. Random slopes were fit for each subject. SEs are given in parentheses. 
 
 
 
	  
Satiated	   HS-­‐1	   SH-­‐1	   Hungry	  
	  
No-­‐Gap	   No-­‐Gap	  
Constant	   0.62	   0.73	   0.93	   1.07	  
(0.07)	   (0.33)	   (0.10)	   (0.08)	  
Health	  	  
0.05	   0.05	   0.11	   0.07	  
(0.02)	   (0.03)	   (0.06)	   (0.03)	  
Taste	  
0.41	   0.49	   0.51	   0.60	  
(0.04)	   (0.09)	   (0.06)	   (0.04)	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Table 3. Estimates of a linear regression of a measure of the empathy gaps on measures 
of the taste perception, baseline value, and taste weighting mechanisms. The regression 
accounts for measurement error on the independent variables. See text for details. 
Standard errors appear below in parentheses.  
** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.  
 
 
	  
Bid	  difference	  
(all	  trials)	  
Bid	  difference	  
(SH	  trials	  only)	  
Bid	  difference	  
(HS	  trials	  only)	  
	   	   	  
Baseline	  Value	  
	  	  	  	  0.92	  ***	   	   	  	  	  	  0.92	  ***	   	  	  	  	  0.87	  ***	  
(0.05)	   	   (0.11)	   (0.05)	  
Taste	  Perception	  
	  	  	  	  0.47	  ***	   	   	  	  	  0.65	  ***	   	  	  	  	  0.28***	  
(0.07)	   	   (0.11)	   (0.08)	  
Taste	  Weighting	  
	  	  	  0.39	  ***	  
(0.09)	  
	  
	  
0.26	  **	  
(0.12)	  
	  0.65	  ***	  
(0.13)	  
	   	   	   	  
